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Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in Chinese 
Grassroots Courts? Rural Land Disputes Between 
Married-Out Women and Village Collectives 
 
BY PETER C.H. CHAN† 
 
This Article tests Galanter’s party capability theory in China’s grassroots courts  by 
empirically examining 858 sampled judgments of rural land dispute lawsuits between married- 
out women (the “have-nots,” or the less resourceful party) and village collectives (the 
“haves,” or the more resourceful party) throughout China from 2009 to 2017. An analysis of 
this study’s results yields a groundbreaking discovery, the “have-nots” came out ahead in 
China’s courts by a substantial margin. This finding contradicts Galanter’s theory—under 
which the “haves” should prevail—and the established view that the “haves” should come out 
ahead in China (a leading study on Shanghai courts found the “haves” prevailing by large 
margins). This discovery is significant because the Chinese judicial system, like its  
counterparts in other authoritarian states, is commonly seen as a system that favors the 
“haves” in a disproportionate manner due to the lack of judicial independence, which 
enhances the likelihood of courts being swayed by powerful external influence in favor of the 
stronger party. This Article argues that Galanter’s theory is inapplicable, as the data shows, 
when courts favor the “have-nots” over the “haves.” It is believed that the courts’ favor for 
the “have-nots” neutralized the party-capability advantages enjoyed by the “haves” and 
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Since the groundbreaking work of Marc Galanter,1 the party capability 
theory has generated extensive scholarship. The theory suggests that the 
disparity of parties’ status and resources (or relative party capability)2 is the 
determining factor of litigation success. It is believed that the “haves,” usually 
referring to the repeat player (RP) with more experience, greater resources, and 
superior status, will “come out ahead” in court.3 The “have-nots,” who are 
usually one-shotters (OS), are less resourceful and in disadvantaged positions.4 
Galanter’s theory, which focused on the U.S. judicial system, has been tested 
(with varying conclusions) in later studies on other jurisdictions, such as 
Canada, 5 Australia, 6 Israel, 7 Russia, 8 the Philippines, 9 and England. 10 The 
varying conclusions could be the result of differences in legal culture, the role 
and authority of the judiciary, and the political underpinnings of the justice 
system. The party capability theory was also tested in China (emphasizing 
courts in Shanghai) by He and Su, where it was revealed that the “haves” came 
out ahead by substantial margins (“He and Su’s Study”).11 
The present study tests Galanter’s theory by examining rural land dispute 
lawsuits in Chinese grassroots courts between married-out women (MOW) 12 
as plaintiffs, and village collectives as defendants13 (“MOW lawsuits”). MOW 
are rural women married to outsiders—either based in cities or in other 
villages—who chose to retain their household registration (hukou) in their 
 
1. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 
9Law& SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). 
2. Xin He & Yang Su, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in Shanghai Courts?, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 120, 121–22 (2013). 
3. Galanter, supra note 1, at 97–104. 
4. Id. 
5. See Peter McCormick, Party Capability Theory and Appellate Success in the Supreme Court of 
Canada, 1949–1992, 26 CANADIAN J. POL. SCI. 523, 524–25 (1993). 
6. See Reginald S. Sheehan & Kirk A. Randazzo, Explaining Litigant Success in the High Court of 
Australia, 47 AUSTRALIAN J. POL. SCI. 239, 239–40 (2012). 
7. See Yoav Dotan, Do the “Haves” Still Come Out Ahead? Resource Inequalities in Ideological 
Courts: The Case of the Israeli High Court of Justice, 33 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 1059, 1059–61 (1999). 
8. See Kathryn Hendley et al., Do Repeat Players Behave Differently in Russia? Contractual and 
Litigation Behavior of Russian Enterprises, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 833, 833–34 (1999). 
9. See Stacia L. Haynie, Resource Inequalities and Litigation Outcomes in the Philippine Supreme 
Court, 56 J. POL. 752, 752–53 (1994) [hereinafter Haynie, Resource Inequalities and Litigation Outcomes]; 
see also Stacia L. Haynie, Resource Inequalities and Regional Variation in Litigation Outcomes in the 
Philippine Supreme Court, 1961–1986, 48 POL. RES. Q. 371, 371 (1995) [hereinafter Haynie, Resource 
Inequalities and Regional Variation]. 
10. See Burton M. Atkins, Party Capability Theory as an Explanation for Intervention Behavior in the 
English Court of Appeal, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 881, 882 (1991). 
11. He & Su, supra note 2, at 131–32. 
12. In Chinese, waijia nü (外嫁女). 
13. Also known as “Rural Collective Economic Organizations.” In Chinese, nongcun jiti jingji zuzhi ( 农
村集体经济组织). 
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natal village, instead of transferring their registration to their husbands’ 
village.14 MOW lawsuits are commenced by MOW litigants to challenge the 
compensation allocation decisions of their natal village collectives.15 When the 
government expropriates rural land for development, the village collective will 
receive monetary compensation from the state. 16 Under law, the village 
collective must distribute this monetary compensation to its members. 17 
However, many village collectives refuse to distribute to MOW on the basis 
that the MOW lost village collective membership the moment they married out 
of the village. A number of national laws protect women’s rural land rights 
provided they are members of the village collective.18 However, the law also 
protects “village autonomy” under which the villagers’ committees (or village 




14. MOW are very likely to retain their household registrations in their natal village, because if they 
transferred the registrations to their husbands’ villages, it is likely that the MOW would not be entitled to any 
land rights in their husbands’ village due to China’s land policy. See Ellen R. Judd, No Change for Thirty 
Years: The Renewed Question of Women’s Land Rights in Rural China, 38 DEV. & CHANGE  689, 694 (2007); 
see also Nongcun Tudi Chengbao Fa (农村土地承包法) [Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas] (promulgated 
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 2002, effective Mar. 1, 2003) 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2002-08/30/content_5299419.htm, art. 20 (China); Tudi Guanli Fa ( 土
地 管 理 法 ) [Land Management Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.  Nat’l People’s Cong., June  25, 
1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987) http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2004-10/21/content_5334569.htm, art. 14 
(China). 
15. Galanter, supra note 1, at 110. MOW lawsuits, in which the OS sues the RP, are considered under 
Galanter’s theory as non-routine cases that: 
“usually represent[] the attempt of some OS to invoke outside help to create leverage on an 
organization with which he has been having dealings but is now at the point of divorce ......... The 
OS claimant generally has little interest in the state of the law; the RP defendant, however, is 
greatly interested.” 
Id.  
16. In Chinese,  tudi zhengshou buchang feiyong (土地征收补偿费用). See Wuquan Fa ( 物权法) 
[Property Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007) 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2007-03/16/content_366956.htm art. 132 (China). 
17. See Guanyu Shenli Sheji Nongcun Tudi Chengbao Jiufen Anjian Shiyong Falü Wenti de Jieshi (关于
审理涉及农村土地承包纠纷案件适用法律问题的解释) [Interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court on 
Issues Concerning Application of Laws for Trial of Rural Land Contracting Dispute Cases] (promulgated by 
Sup. People’s Ct., July 29, 2005, effective Sept. 1, 2005) art. 24, (China) (“Rural collective economic 
organization, or village committee, or villagers’ group, conforming to the democratic procedure provided by 
laws, can allocate the compensation of land expropriation inside the collective. Courts should uphold the claim 
for equal rights of allocation of the individuals, who had owned the membership before the allocation 
agreement for compensation for the land expropriation was set down.”). 
18. See, e.g., Funü Quanyi Baozhang Fa (妇女权益保障法) [Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights 
and   Interests]   (promulgated   by   the   Nat’l   People’s   Cong.,   Apr.   3,   1992,   effective   Oct.   1,  1992) 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/05/content_5004563.htm, art. 30–33 (China); see also Cunmin 
Weiyuanhui Zuzhi Fa (村民委员会组织法) [Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committees] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2010, effective Oct. 28, 2010) http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2010- 
10/28/content_1732986.htm,  art. 27 (China); Hunyin Fa ( 婚姻法)  [Marriage Law] (promulgated by the 
Standing      Comm.      Nat’l      People’s      Cong.,      Sept.      10,      1980,      effective      Jan.      1,   1981) 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/vitalstatkb/Attachment421.aspx?AttachmentType=1, art. 39(2) (China); Law on 
Land Contract in Rural Areas, art. 6, 30. 
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the rural community.19 In practice, the line of this autonomy is unclear.20 The 
Supreme People’s Court’s (“SPC”) Explanation on Rural Land Contract,21 
which is frequently referred to by courts when dealing with MOW lawsuits, 
made clear that courts should uphold equal rights in the allocation of 
compensation regarding women who hold the village collective membership 
prior to the conclusion of the allocation process. 22 Despite having gender 
equality statutes, 23 the law fails to provide a nationwide test for village 
collective membership. In practice, the village collective applies its own test to 
determine membership, which in its view, is within its “autonomy.” 24 Many 
village collectives took advantage of this lacuna in the law to deny the MOW’s 
entitlement to compensation, arguing that the MOW ceased to be members of 
the collective the moment they were married.25 From the village collective’s 
perspective, the problem is not about the MOW getting married, but rather, 
marrying out of the village. Chinese customs consider that once she marries 
out, a woman becomes part of her husband’s village and no longer qualifies as 
a member of her natal village.26 
19. See, e.g., Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees art. 24 (“The following matters that involve the 
interests of the villagers shall be dealt with only  upon  the  villagers’  assembly’s  decision  through  
discussion . . . . Proposals on the use and distribution of land-use compensation fees . . . . Other matters 
involving villagers’ interests which the villagers’ assembly believes should be decided by it through 
discussion.”); see also id. art. 1–3, 5, 8; XIANFA art. 17, 111 (1982) (China). 
20. The SPC has invited the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) to issue an 
interpretation to provide for a nationwide test for “village collective membership status.” See Gaofa Chutai 
 
 
Supreme People’s Court on Issues Concerning Application of Laws for Trial of Rural Land Contracting 
Dispute Cases], Zhōngguó fǎyuàn wǎng (中国法院网) [CHINA COURT NETWORK] http://sientechina.china. 
com.cn/chinese/2005/Jul/927977.htm (China). No interpretation has been provided by the NPCSC to date. 
21. Interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court on Issues Concerning Application of Laws for Trial of 
Rural Land Contracting Dispute Cases, art. 24. 
22. Id. 
23. But see Xin He, Why Did They Not Take on the Disputes? Law, Power and Politics in the Decision- 
Making of Chinese Courts, 3 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 203, 209 (2007) (“[T]here are no clear regulations on this 
issue, or relevant regulations are contradictory.”). 
24. Some guidance can be found in provincial rules, but it is ultimately a question to be decided by the 
village collective. See Guangdong Sheng Nongcun Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Guanli Guiding (广东省农村集体经济组
织管理规定) [Organic Regulations of the Guangdong Province Village Economic Cooperation Associations] 
(promulgated by the Guangdong Province Government, May 31, 2013, effective June 20, 2013), 
zwgk.gd.gov.cn/006939748/201306/t20130620_378332.html (China); Zhejiang Sheng Cun Jingji Hezuoshe 
Zuzhi Tiaoli ( 浙江省村经济合作社组织条例 )  [Organic Regulations of the Zhejiang Province Village 
Economic Cooperation Associations] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. People’s Cong. Zhejiang Province, 




25. He mentioned that “a more direct reason for such a decision [to exclude MOW] is that additional 
persons to share a given lump sum of benefits will inevitably reduce the value of each share.” See He, supra 
note 23, at 207. 
26. Judd, supra note 14, at 690. 
Shenli Nongcun Tudi Chengbao Jiufen Anjian de Jieshi (Dawen) (高法出台审理农村土地承包纠纷案件的
解 释 ( 答 问 )) [Q&A of the Supreme People’s Court Regarding the Promulgation of the Interpretations of the 
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MOW lawsuits fit well into the dichotomy of “haves” and “have-nots,” 
given the clear “asymmetric relationship” between the village collectives and 
the MOW. 27 With fewer resources (as an individual OS-litigant) and an 
inferior social status (being the subject of discrimination), MOW litigants fall 
squarely into the category of the “have-nots.” The village collective, on the 
other hand, fits neatly into the category of “haves” as a quasi-administrative 
rural institution with government backing (and also as an RP-litigant). This is 
the first time Galanter’s theory has been tested on a single-issue litigation in 
Chinese courts that impacts gender equality.28 This study finds, contrary to 
Galanter’s theory and He and Su’s Study, the “have-nots” (the MOW) in fact 
came out ahead. This finding provides a breakthrough in the understanding of 
how resource inequality of parties affects litigation outcomes in a developing 
authoritarian state. 
Part I begins with a discussion of the debate on the party capability theory 
and testing the theory on Chinese courts. Part II provides an overview of the 
issue of MOW’s land rights in China. Part III outlines the data, methodology, 
and variables, and Part IV presents the empirical findings. The main discovery 
is the “have-nots” (the MOW) came out ahead by a substantial margin, 
contradicting Galanter’s theory and the findings in He and Su’s Study. In 
addition, an analysis is conducted to identify the variations of the MOW’s 
success rate by a number of relevant independent variables. Although it does 
not reveal the causal relations between the independent variables and the 
MOW litigant’s success rate, it enriches the literature in this area. 29 This 
Article ends with an explanation of why the “have-nots” (the MOW) came out 
ahead and other observations from the data in Part IV, and the implications of 














27. See Atkins, supra note 10, at 884–85. 
28. He and Su’s Study was on multiple types of litigations involving different kinds of parties. He & Su, 
supra note 2, at 127. 
29. See KWAI HANG NG & XIN HE, EMBEDDED COURTS: JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING IN CHINA (2017); 
He, supra note 23; He & Su, supra note 2. Also see the body of literature debating Galanter’s party capability 
theory. See, e.g., Donald R. Songer, et al., Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead over Time? Applying Galanter’s 
Framework to Decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1925-1988, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 811 (1999). 
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I. TESTING GALANTER’S PARTY CAPABILITY THEORY ON CHINESE COURTS: 
LEGAL BATTLES BETWEEN MARRIED-OUT WOMEN (“HAVE-NOTS”) AND 
VILLAGE COLLECTIVES (“HAVES”) 
 
A. DEBATING GALANTER’S THEORY 
Due to the disparity of status, litigation experience, and resources, 
Galanter “expect[ed] an RP to play the litigation game differently from an 
OS.”30 The strategic advantages of the RP are seen in its rich experience in 
litigating the issue (i.e. understanding how the game is played), superior 
expertise (for example, quality legal representation and experts), its influence 
over the institutional decision-makers, its ability to push for “rule- 
development” that works in its favor, and the resources to pursue either or both 
the short-term and long-term goals in litigation.31 
This is contrasted with the position of the OS, who is inexperienced, has 
limited resources, lacks the institutional advantages that the RP has, and is only 
able to pursue short-term goals in litigation.32 The stakes in the individual case 
are much higher for the OS than the RP, which allows the RP to “play the 
odds.”33 In other words, the RP can afford to risk losing an individual case if 
doing so can bring about long-term benefits. The OS does not have this luxury, 
as too much is at stake in the individual case. 
Galanter’s theory suggests, even in systems that place a high premium on 
procedural fairness and impartiality, the strategic advantages of the RP are 
unaffected.34 One reason to explain this is the RP is able to outspend the OS in 
litigation and make procedural maneuvers that only someone with the RP’s 
resources can afford. A typical tactic is to delay the litigation as much as 
possible so that the OS is drained of all of its funds. The institutional 
advantages available to the RP, including its ability to push for rule 
development, ensure that the “rules of the game” are tilted in the RP’s favor.35 
Many studies have confirmed Galanter’s theory,36 with some confirming 
it in principle but providing revisions and qualifications to the theory.37 Some 
 
30. Galanter, supra note 1, at 98. 
31. Id. at 99–103. 
32. Id. at 98. 
33. Id. at 99–100. 
34. He & Su, supra note 2, at 122. 
35. Galanter, supra note 1, at 102–03. 
36. See Atkins, supra note 10, at 882 (testing and confirming Galanter’s theory in the English Court of 
Appeal); see also Donald J. Farole Jr., Reexamining Litigant Success in State Supreme Courts, 33 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 1043, 1054 (1999) (generally confirming Galanter’s theory by analyzing data from five state 
supreme courts of the United States); McCormick, supra note 5, at 523–25 (affirming the party capability 
theory in the Canadian Supreme Court); Songer et al., supra note 29, at 830 (finding the “haves” came out 
ahead in the federal courts of appeals in the United States over a sixty-four-year period). 
37. See Beth Harris, Representing Homeless Families: Repeat Player Implementation Strategies, 33 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 911, 911–12 (1999) (arguing that “by skillfully combining adversarial legal tactics with 
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studies have directly questioned whether the “haves” always come out ahead. 
For instance, a study conducted on the Israeli High Court of Justice found that 
the “have-nots,” when represented, came out ahead.38 Another study suggested 
that the participation of amicus curiae in aid of the OS could neutralize the 
advantages enjoyed by the RP.39 An important study on the U.S. Supreme 
Court contradicted Galanter’s theory by finding that the “ideological 
composition” of the Court was the determining factor for litigation success.40 
The most forceful rebuttal of Galanter’s theory comes from Stacia 
Haynie,41 who argued that while Galanter’s theory is proven to be generally 
accurate in industrialized societies, it may not be applicable to developing 
“non-industrialized” states.42 Using the Philippine Supreme Court as a test 
case, Haynie argued that courts in developing states do not enjoy the same kind 
of legitimacy as enjoyed by their counterparts in industrialized nations.43 This 
legitimacy is crucial for stability and development.44 In the developed world, 
the public views the courts as generally impartial and fair.45 This is not so in 
developing states, where the courts are considered to be partial (favoring the 
privileged) and even corrupt.46 The presumption of judicial bias towards the 
“haves” creates instability, something that greatly concerns the courts of 
developing countries, especially when under authoritarian rule (in Haynie’s  
test case, the Marcos era).47 In an attempt to establish their legitimacy, courts  
in developing countries will purposefully side with the “have-nots,” using 





collaboration, poverty lawyers can transform judicial decisions into ‘symbolic resources’ to leverage the 
implementation of redistributive remedies”); see also Joel B. Grossman et al., Do the “Haves” Still Come Out 
Ahead?, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 803, 810 (1999) (arguing that “the relative advantages between and among 
litigants is more nuanced and dynamic than the terms one shotter and repeat player suggest”); Sheehan & 
Randazzo, supra note 6, at 253–54 (arguing “that party capability theory needs to expand beyond the Galanter 
hypothesis, and define more broadly party capability as determined by litigant characteristics, legal structures 
and legal cultures”); Stanton Wheeler et al., Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead? Winning and Losing in State 
Supreme Courts, 1870–1970, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 403, 443 (1987) (finding the “haves” came out ahead in 
U.S. state supreme courts, but only by a thin margin); Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Who Wins on 
Appeal? Upperdogs and Underdogs in the United States Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 235, 254 
(1992) (finding the “haves” came out ahead in U.S. Courts of Appeals). 
38. Dotan, supra note 7, at 1071–72. 
39. Donald Songer et al., Why the Haves Don’t Always Come Out Ahead: Repeat Players Meet Amici 
Curiae for the Disadvantaged, 53 POL. RES. Q. 537, 547–48 (2000). 
40. Reginald S. Sheehan et al., Ideology, Status, and the Differential Success of Direct Parties Before the 
Supreme Court, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 464, 470 (1992). 
41. See generally Haynie, Resource Inequalities and Litigation Outcomes, supra note 9 (discovering that 
the “have-nots” came out ahead in the Philippine Supreme Court). 
42. Id. at 753. 
43. Id. 
44.  Id. at 754. 
45.  Id. at 753. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 764. 
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components of their docket, thus potentially increasing their own legitimacy 
and stability within the political system.”48 
 
B. TESTING GALANTER’S THEORY ON CHINESE COURTS 
He and Su’s Study confirmed the party capability theory, but argued that 
factors other than resource inequality also contributed to  the  “haves’"  
success. 49 A major factor is that Chinese courts are particularly prone to 
outside influences, especially influence from the government.50 It is argued  
that the lack of judicial independence has augmented the power imbalance 
between the “haves” and the “have-nots.”51 He and Su’s Study covered a wide 
range of disputes involving litigants of different natures: businesses, farmers, 
non-farmer individuals, and government agencies or government-related 
companies. 52 Government agencies or government-related companies, who 
were RPs, turned out to be the most successful litigants, while farmers, who 
were OSs, were the most unsuccessful.53 In other words, the central finding of 
He and Su’s Study is that under the Chinese judicial system, the “have-nots,” 
who are individual OS-litigants from an underprivileged group, lose the most 
to the “haves,” who are institutional RP-litigants with governmental backing.54 
This finding was confirmed in another study on the media’s success rate in 
defamation litigation in China.55 It was revealed that “the media’s odds of 
success would be reduced by 76 per cent if they were sued by the government 
and officials, comparing with the odds when they were sued by non- 
government officials or non-government organizations.”56 Another study has 
found that Chinese courts favored “politically connected” corporate litigants.57 
 
 
48. Id. at 753. 
49. He & Su, supra note 2, at 139 (“Given our data, one could continue to argue that resources still make 
a difference. That is to say, the party capability thesis remains intact, if not sufficient, to explain away the 
winning gap between the haves and the have-nots.”). 
50. Id. at 140–41 (“The existing empirical studies suggest that resource difference is one of the foremost 
reasons why the haves come out ahead, but when the courts are susceptible to external influences, this could 
overshadow any other reasons, including litigation capacity.” (citation omitted)). 
51. Id. at 141. 
52. Id. at 132 tbl.2. 
53. See id. at 131–32. 
54. Id. 
55. Xin He & Fen Lin, The Losing Media? An Empirical Study of Defamation Litigation in China, 230 
CHINA Q. 371, 385–86 (2017). 
56. Id. 
57. Haitian Lu et al., Political Connectedness and Court Outcomes: Evidence from Chinese Corporate 
Lawsuits, 58 J.L. & ECON. 829, 857 (2015) (finding “robust empirical evidence that firms’ political 
connectedness, in the form of state ownership or management’s personal political ties in private firms, is 
associated with better court outcomes. This likely reflects the fact that the state uses its nonindependent 
judiciary to redistribute wealth from parties that are not politically favored to those that are.”). But see Wei 
Cui, Does Judicial Independence Matter? A Study of the Determinants of Administrative Litigation in an 
Authoritarian Regime, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 941, 950 (2017) (stating that plaintiffs (OS) are losing to the tax 
authorities (RP) in administrative litigations, but arguing that it is the result of “information asymmetry” and 
adverse legal rules, rather than the courts favoring the tax authorities). 
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Similar to the farmers in He and Su’s Study, the MOW are individual OS- 
litigants from an underprivileged group that is under constant discrimination. 
Rural land policies are often “invisibly ‘gendered’”58 or perpetuate “traditional 
and new forms of gender discrimination.”59 By marrying outsiders, MOW are 
considered “outsiders” by their natal villages.60 An MOW’s rights to receive 
government compensation are taken away from them on the basis that they are 
no longer “members” of the village collective. MOW are usually 
underrepresented in rural governance,61 giving them close to no say in the 
compensation allocation process. 
Similar to the government agencies or government-related companies in 
He and Su’s Study, village collectives are government-backed rural 
administrative institutions. The government adopts a policy of “village 
autonomy,” giving village collectives extensive administrative powers over 
internal rural matters.62 The village collective has to deal with numerous MOW 
lawsuits each year, making it an obvious RP. As a rural collective institution, it 
has at its disposal far greater resources than the MOW litigants (individuals), 
which are not limited to money, but extend to connections with the 
government, local courts, and other institutions that could provide help in 
litigations of this nature. The stakes are inevitably much higher for the MOW 
than the village collective. This allows the village collective, in the words of 
Galanter, to “play the odds.”63 
If one follows the findings from He and Su’s Study, the village collective, 
as the government-backed and “politically connected” institutional RP, should 
unquestionably prevail over the MOW, the underprivileged individual OS- 
litigants. Is this really the case? As this study will show, contrary to the party 
capability theory, MOW litigants (the “have-nots”) are winning these lawsuits 








58. Laurel Bossen, Reproduction and Real Property in Rural China: Three Decades of Development and 
Discrimination, in WOMEN, GENDER AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 97, 98 (Tamara Jacka & Sally 
Sargeson eds., 2011). 
59. Junjie Chen & Gale Summerfield, Gender and Rural Reforms in China: A Case Study of Population 
Control and Land Rights Policies in Northern Liaoning, 13 FEMINIST ECON. 63, 83 (2007). 
60. Neky Tak-ching Cheung, A Religious Menopausal Ritual: Changing Body, Identity, and Values, in 
GENDERING CHINESE RELIGION: SUBJECT, IDENTITY, AND BODY 225, 239 (Jinhua Jiaet al. eds., 1st ed. 2014). 
61. BAOGANG HE, RURAL DEMOCRACY IN CHINA: THE ROLE OF VILLAGE ELECTIONS 126–28 (2007). 
62. See Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees art. 24. 
63. Galanter, supra note 1, at 99–100. 
64. Out of the 858 sampled cases, the MOW litigants won 93.90% of the time (combining “complete 
win” (76.50%) and “partial win” (17.4%)). See infra Table 4. The MOW litigant only lost 6.20% of the time. 
See infra Table 4. 
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C. DO THE “HAVES” COME OUT AHEAD IN MARRIED-OUT WOMEN 
LAWSUITS?—TWO PROPOSITIONS 
1. Proposition 1: Why the “Haves” (Village Collectives) Should Come 
Out Ahead in China 
Previous studies show that civil remedies were rarely available to MOW 
litigants,65 as courts were unwilling to extend their civil jurisdiction to cover 
MOW cases.66 Even when courts accept their cases, courts tend to favor the 
village collectives given their status as quasi-governing institutions in the rural 
regions. The courts are more concerned about maintaining stability and 
ensuring that the rural collectives’ interests are not jeopardized by challenges 
from the MOW litigants. This view is consistent with the policy of “village 
autonomy,” that rural matters should be handled by representatives of the 
village.67 
The lack of judicial independence means Chinese courts are susceptible  
to external interference. In the rural political context, the village collective 
wields far greater power than the individual MOW litigants (who lack social 
and political connections). Thus, the village collective is far more capable of 
influencing the courts. Courts may also be concerned that if the MOW litigants 
get what they wanted, it would open a floodgate of litigation against the village 
collectives, resulting in the deterioration of local stability. Galanter’s theory 
should apply given the clear resource asymmetry between the parties. In this 
case, the judicial politics in China would augment the advantages enjoyed by 
the “haves” (village collectives). 
2. Proposition 2: Why the “Have-Nots” (Married-Out Women) Should 
Come Out Ahead in China 
It is possible that the courts side with the MOW to uphold gender 
equality, or even out of sympathy for the MOW litigants. Despite policy 
constraints and bureaucratic red-tape, Chinese courts, as any courts in the 




65. Xiaoli Wang (王晓莉) & Huiying Li（李慧英), Woguo Nongcun Tudi Zhengce yu Shijian Fenxi (我
国农村土地政策与实践分析—聚焦农村妇女土地权益问题) [Land Policies and Practice in Rural China: 
Focusing  on  Rural  Women’s  Land  Rights  and  Interests],  Kēxué  Shèhuì  Zhǔyì  ( 科学社会主义 )  [SCI. 
SOCIALSIM] 116, 118 (2014) (China). 
66. See He, supra note 23, at 210. 
67. The power relationship between grassroots courts and the rural administration (township government 
and rural collectives) is deep-seated and complex. While grassroots courts are not answerable to the rural 
administration, the informal powers wielded by the rural administration sometimes make it impossible for 
courts not to take into account their vested interests. In some regions, courts take the view that issues relating 
to MOW are within the ambit of village autonomy and refuse to “interfere.” Even when courts are bold in 
defending MOW’s land rights, resistance from the rural collective could delay or block enforcement. 
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provisions favor the MOW. 68 It would be difficult for the court not to enforce 
pro-MOW rules, unless there were overriding policy concerns.69 The risk of 
instability arising from MOW disputes is low. It would be a relatively “safe” 
domain for the courts to simply apply the laws that protect the MOW.70 
Echoing Haynie’s theory, it can also be argued that the courts in China 
need to establish their legitimacy through adopting a redistributive policy when 
adjudicating MOW lawsuits, which might result in the “have-nots” 
prevailing.71 The institutional disadvantages of the Chinese judiciary can be 
reversed through establishing a public image that the courts are protectors of 
the “have-nots.” This legitimacy-building exercise benefits not just the court 
system, but also individual judges who now post their judgments online. 
 




Rural women around the world, especially in developing countries, 
continue to suffer from the rural gender gap. Some argue the primary cause of 
the rural gender gap was the deprivation or suppression of rural  women’s 
rights to access and own land. 72 The negative impact on rural women is 
augmented by trends in some communities, such as in Vietnam and India, 
where more rural men are now engaging in non-agricultural activities, leaving 






68. See supra text accompanying note 18. 
69. For example, if the losing village collective threatens to destabilize the rural community. 
70. While village collective membership is legally undefined, courts may be willing to fill this gap by 
finding in favor of the MOW as long as they can show some connection with their natal villages. Connection 
with the MOW’s natal village will be discussed in detail and empirically tested below. 
71. Haynie, Resource Inequalities and Litigation Outcomes, supra note 9, at 769; Haynie, Resource 
Inequalities and Regional Variation, supra note 9, at 378. 
72. See, e.g., Bina Agarwal, Gender and Command over Property: A Critical Gap in Economic Analysis 
and Policy in South Asia, 22 WORLD DEV. 1455, 1467 (1994); see also Nuria Pena et al., Using Rights-Based 
and Gender-Analysis Arguments for Land Rights for Women: Some Initial Reflections from Nicaragua, 16 
GENDER & DEV. 55, 67–68 (2008) (emphasizing the need for a dialogue among the multiple approaches to the 
“issue of gender and land” given the complexity of the issue and that titling cannot once and for all provide 
rural women full access to land if it is not accompanied by “a process that makes such rights  socially 
legitimate and enforceable”). But see, e.g., Cecile Jackson, Gender Analysis of Land: Beyond Land Rights for 
Women?, 3 J. AGRARIAN CHANGE 453, 457 (2003) (arguing that there are multiple reasons that contribute to 
the rural gender gap, and suggesting that increasing access to land for rural women, unlike rural men, does not 
necessarily elevate women’s socio-economic status, given that there are so many other factors, such as “social 
relations of productions,” that contribute to the inferior position of rural women vis-à-vis rural men); K.C. Roy 
& C.A. Tisdell, Property Rights in Women’s Empowerment in Rural India: A Review, 29 INT’L J. SOC. ECON. 
315, 332 (2002) (arguing that, in the context of rural India, “ownership rights to property are important, but 
customary rights to access the property are more important for women’s empowerment”). 
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family.73 As land ownership contributes to rural women’s empowerment,74 the 
lack of land ownership weakens rural women. This weakness caused by 
landlessness is certainly felt in rural China. In China, the problem of gender 
inequality is particularly acute in rural regions where traditional Chinese 
customs favor men over women.75 Rural women, including MOW, have fewer 
opportunities to be educated when compared to rural men, who usually occupy 
leadership roles within the rural community. According to an investigation, 
rural women without land are usually less educated than those with land 
entitlements in China.76 The MOW issue in China is particularly complicated 
for the following reasons. 
First, the national statutes have not provided a test to determine 
“membership status” of the village collective.77 While many call for a unified 
national standard, some argue that it is unrealistic to do so,78 partly due to the 
difficulty in defining in concrete terms the concepts of “(rural) land property 
rights” and “membership.”79 The diverse rules in different regions also make it 
 
73. See Bina Agarwal, Gender and Land Rights Revisited: Exploring New Prospects via the State,  
Family and Market, 3 J. AGRARIAN CHANGE 184, 192 (2003); see also Mary H. Nguyen, Rural Women’s 
Property Rights in Vietnam: Weakened by Macroeconomic Reforms, 13 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 105, 
109 (2006). 
74. See Khushbu Mishra & Abdoul G. Sam, Does Women’s Land Ownership Promote Their 
Empowerment? Empirical Evidence from Nepal, 78 WORLD DEV. 360, 368 (2016) (“By employing several 
econometric techniques and robustness checks, we find that women’s land ownership in Nepal significantly 
increases their empowerment, defined by household decision-making in areas of own healthcare, major 
household purchases, and visits to family or relatives.”). 
75. Yang Li & Xi Yin-Sheng, Married Women’s Rights to Land in China’s Traditional Farming Areas, 
15 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 621, 629 (2006). 
76. Ying Luo (罗颖), Yifang Zheng (郑逸芳) & Senwei Huang (黄森慰), Nongcun Waijianü Tudi 
Quanyi Baohu Qingkuang Fenxi: Jiyu Fujian Sheng 108 Fen Wenjuan Diaocha Shuju (农村外嫁女土地权益
保护情况分析——基于福建省 108 份问卷调查数据) [An Analysis on the Protection of Land Rights of 
Rural Married-Out-Women: Based on 108 Pieces of Questionnaires in Fujian Province], 19 NÈIMÉNGGǓ 
NÓNGYÈ DÀXUÉ XUÉBÀO (Shèhuì Kēxué Bǎn) (内蒙古农业大学学报 (社会科学版)) [J. INNER MONG. 
AGRIC. U. (SOC. SCI. EDITION)] 16, 20 tbl3 (2017) (China). 
77. See Gaofa Chutai Shenli Nongcun Tudi Chengbao Jiufen Anjian de Jieshi (Dawen) (高法出台审理
农村土地承包纠纷案件的解释(答问)) [Q&A of the Supreme People’s Court Regarding the Promulgation of 
the Interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court on Issues Concerning Application of Laws for Trial of Rural 
Land Contracting Dispute Cases] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., July 29, 2005) 
http://sientechina.china.com.cn/chinese/2005/Jul/927977.htm (China); Wang & Li, supra note 65, at 118. 
78. Hao Tang (唐浩), Cungui Minyue Shijiao Xia de Nongdi Zhidu: Wenben Jiedu (村规民约视角下的
农地制度: 文本解读) [Rural Land in the Perspective of Village Charter: Textual Analysis], 28 ZHŌNGGUÓ 
NÓNGYÈ DÀXUÉ XUÉBÀO (Shèhuì Kēxué Bǎn) (中国农业大学学报(社会科学版)) [CHINA AGRIC. U. J. (SOC. 
SCI. EDITION)] 106 (2011) (China). 
79. See Jing Shen (申静) & Hansheng Wang (王汉生), Jiti Chanquan Zai Zhongguo Xiangcun Shenghuo 
zhong de Shijian Luoji—Shehuixue Shijiao xia de Chanquan Goujian Guocheng (集体产权在中国乡村生活
中的实践逻辑——社会学视角下的产权构建过程) [The Practical Logic of Property Rights in Rural China 
Life: The Process of Contracting Property Rights from the Sociological Perspective], 115 SHÈHUÌ XUÉ YÁNJIŪ 
( 社会学研究 ) [SOC.  RES.] 113 ， 142 (2005); see also Jing Li ( 李菁 ) & Danli Yan ( 颜丹丽 ), Jiti 
Chengyuanquan he Tudi Chengbao Shouyiquan de Chongtu yu Xietiao: Wending Diquan yu Buwending 
Diquan de Duibi——Yi Xishui Cun Di Ba Cunmin Xiaozu Liangci Zhengdi Buchangfei Fenpei Weili (集体成 
员权和土地承包收益权的冲突与协调: 稳定地权与不稳定地权的对比——以西水村第八村民小组两次征 
地补偿费分配为例) [Tension and Conciliation Between Collective Member Rights and Contractual Land 
Rights: A Contrast Between Stable Land Rights and Unstable Land Rights] ZHŌNGGUÓ NÓNGCŪN GUĀNCHÁ ( 
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very difficult to standardize such a practice.80 The lack of a unified legal 
standard leaves room for controversy. 
Second, rural governance in China is based on the principle of “village 
autonomy.”81 The power to allocate and distribute rural collective income and 
interests deriving from land is vested in the village collectives. As the minority, 
the MOW frequently find themselves being outvoted by other villagers on the 
matter of allocation of land expropriation compensation. 82 Village  leaders, 
even if they had the vision and resolve to protect gender equality, have to yield 
to majority pressure if the majority holds a strong view of not distributing to  
the MOW.83 
Third, discrimination against women in China is imbued in its traditional 
culture. The Chinese phrase “giving men greater weight over women,” 84 
applies at least in terms of social status and legal entitlement.85  This problem is 
 
中国农村观察) [CHINA RURAL SURV.] 26, 26–27 (2011); Tiejun Wen (温铁军), Ping Wang (王平) & Yan Shi 
(石嫣), Nongcun Gaige Zhong de Caichan Zhidu Bianqian: 30 Nian 3 Ge Cunzhuang de Anli Jieshao (农村改
革中的财产制度变迁——30 年 3 个村庄的案例介绍) [Property Institution Evolution in Rural Reform: 
Introducing Three Countryside Cases] ZHŌNGGUÓ NÓNGCŪN JĪNGJÌ (中国农村经济) [CHINESE RURAL ECON.] 
4, 5 (2008). 
80. Some scholars term this as “legal federalism.” See Jinhua Cheng (程金华) & Zhenxing Ke (柯振兴), 
Zhongguo Falü Quanli de Lianbangzhi Shijian: Yi Laodong Hetongfa Lingyu Wei Li (中国法律权力的联邦制
实践——以劳动合同法领域为例) [The Practice of Federalism in Chinese Legal System: An Empirical Study 
on Labor Contract Law], FǍXUÉ JIĀ (法学家) [JURIST], 2–3 (2018). 
81. Bin Wang ( 王彬),  Xiangcun Shanzhi de Falü Huayuchang ( 乡村善治的法律话语场) [Legal 
Discourse of Good Governance in Rural Areas] SHĀNDŌNG JǏNGCHÁ XUÉYUÀN XUÉBÀO (山东警察学院学报 
) (2008) [J. SHANDONG POLICE C.] 73 [hereinafter Wang, Legal Discourse of Good Governance]; see also 
Meng Hou (侯猛), Cungui Minyue de Sifa Shiyong (村规民约的司法适用) [The Application of Law on 
Village Charters] FǍLǛ SHÌYÒNG (法律适用) [J.L. APPL.] 52, 52 (2010); Dongdong Huang (黄东东) & Ziyi 
Wang (王子毅), Tudi Buchangfei Nonghu Jian de Fenpei: Zhixu yu Fazhi (土地补偿费农户间的分配：秩序
与 法 治 ) [Distribution of Land Compensation among Farmers: Order and Rule of Law], 35 JÍSHǑU DÀXUÉ 
XUÉBÀO (SHÈHUÌ KĒXUÉ BǍN) (吉首大学学报 (社会科学版)) [J. JISHOU U. (SOC. SCI. EDITION)] 78, 79 
(2014); Zhuqing Wang (王竹青), Lun Nongcun Funü Tudi Quanyi Falü Baozhang de Tixihua Goujian (论农
村妇女土地权益法律保障的体系化构建) [Establishing Systems of Legal Protection of Rural Women’s Land 
Rights and Interests] FÙNǙ YÁNJIŪ LÙN CÓNG ( 妇 女 研 究 论 丛 ) [J. CHINESE WOMEN’S STUD.] 49 (2017) 
[hereinafter Wang, Establishing Systems of Legal Protection]. 
82. See Qiong Zou (邹琼), Cunzhuang Zhong de Xingbie Quanli: Zhusanjiao Nancun de Shizheng Yanjiu 
(村庄中的性别权力—珠三角南村的实证研究) [Gender Power in Villages: An Empirical Study on Nancun 
Village in Pearl River Delta], 32 GUǍNGXĪ MÍNZÚ DÀXUÉ XUÉBÀO (ZHÉXUÉ SHÈHUÌ KĒXUÉ BǍN) (广西民族
大学学报(哲学社会科学版)) [J. GUANGXI U. FOR NATIONALITIES (PHIL. & SOC. SCI. EDITION)] 82 (2010); see 
also Jinmei Xia (夏金梅), Guanyu Nongcun Chujianü de Jiti Jingji Quanyi Baozhang: Jiyu Guangdong Sheng 
S Cun de Diaocha (关于农村出嫁女的集体经济权益保障 ——基于广东省 S 村的调查) [Research on the 
Protection of Collective Economic Rights of Rural Married-Out-Women: Based on Investigations in S Village, 
Guangdong Province] LǏLÙN TÀNSUǑ (理论探索) [THEORETICAL EXPLORATION] 85, 85 (2011). 
83. In China, rural land expropriation is the collective decision of the village collective, as rural land is 
collectively owned by the village collective. See XIANFA art. 10 (1982) (China). In other words, the 
government approaches the village collective, not the individual villager, to negotiate and execute the 
expropriation. Individual rural women may only indirectly participate in that decision through their 
representatives in the villagers’ assembly. With such rural land ownership structure, rural women in China are 
placed in a disadvantaged position when compared with jurisdictions where rural property rights can directly 
vest in individuals. 
84. In Chinese: zhongnan qingnü (重男轻女). 
85. Hou, supra note 81. 
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particularly serious in rural China, where men are seen as the main contributor 
of agricultural power and women are considered subordinate to their fathers 
before marriage, and husbands after marriage.86 Village collectives contract 
rural land to families as the “household units” to manage the land. The right- 
holder of the land is usually the adult male in the family.87 As MOW will 
usually move to live with their husbands after getting married (patrilocal 
residence),88 their family of origin will usually consider that the MOW is no 
longer a member of their natal family.89 Sometimes the MOW’s families of 
origin actively undermine the MOW’s land rights and other interests in the 
village.90 Obviously, there will be no unfair treatment if the MOW are given 
land in their husbands’ villages as new members. 91 However, due to the 
national land policy of “no change for thirty years,”92 which aims to stabilize 
and secure investment in rural land, it is very difficult for the MOW to obtain 
any land entitlement at their husbands’ villages.93 
Courts are frequently criticized for their reluctance to provide civil 
remedies to MOW litigants.94 Although the PRC Constitution provides for 
gender equality,95 studies have shown that courts played only a limited role in 
protecting MOW’s land rights, 96 as well as in enforcing gender equality 
 
 
86. See generally H. Ray Liaw, Women’s Land Rights in Rural China: Transforming Existing Laws into 
a Source of Property Rights, 17 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 237 (2008) (describing gender discrimination in rural 
China, exemplified primarily by an inequitable distribution of land). 
87. See Guanyu Kaizhan Nongcun Tudi Chengbao Jingying Quan Dengji Shidian Gongzuo de Yijian (关
于开展农村土地承包经营权登记试点工作的意见) [Opinions on Promoting the Pilot Program of Rural Land 
Contracting  Registration]  (promulgated  by  the  Ministry of  Agric.,  Feb.  5,  2011,  effective  Feb.  5, 2011) 
(Westlaw China) (clarifying that farmers have the right to own the land); Nongcun Tudi Chengbao Jingying 
Quan Dengji Shidian Gongzuo Guicheng (Shixing) (农村土地承包经营权登记试点工作规程 (试行)) 
[Guidelines  on  the  Pilot  Program  of  Rural  Land  Contracting  Registration  (for  Trial  Implementation)] 
(promulgated by the Ministry of Agric., June 27, 2012, effective June 27, 2012) (Westlaw China). MOW are 
underrepresented under the Household Registration System. See Liaw, supra note 86, at 24–41, 250–51; see 
also Guoshen Chen (陈国申) & Qian Gao (高倩), Tudi Quequan Beijing Xia de Nongcun Funü Tudi Quanyi 
Wenti Yanjiu (土地确权背景下的农村妇女土地权益问题研究) [Infringement Problems of Rural Women’s 
Land Rights and Interests and Countermeasures Under the Background of Land Approval] LǏNGDǍO KĒXUÉ 
LÙNTÁN (领导科学论坛) [SCI. LEADERSHIP F.] 51, 53; Zou, supra note 82, at 82 (2007). 
88. Li & Yin-Sheng, supra note 75, at 623; see also Liaw, supra note 86, at 239. 
89. As an old Chinese saying puts it: “A daughter who marries is like spilled water that cannot be 
recovered.” Li & Yin-Sheng, supra note 75, at 629. In Chinese: jia chuqu de nüer po chuqu de shui (嫁出去的
女儿泼出去的水). 
90. Baoping Liu ( 刘 保 平 ) & Lanru Wan ( 万 兰 茹 ), Hebei Sheng Nongcun Funü Tudi Quanyi Baohu 
Zhuangkuang Yanjiu (河北省农村妇女土地权益保护状况研究) [Research on Protection of Women’s Rights 
to Land in Rural Hebei] FÙNǙ YÁNJIŪ LÙN CÓNG (妇女研究论丛) [COLLECTION WOMEN’S STUD.] 11 (2007). 
91. Liaw, supra note 86, at 242 (describing it as “a cycle of loss and gain of land upon marriage”). 
92. Judd, supra note 14, at 689. 
93. Liaw, supra note 86, at 242–43. 
94. See, e.g., He, supra note 23, at 208. 
95. XIANFA art. 48 (1982). 
96. Hua Gui ( 桂 华 ), Lun Fazhi Shengyu de Xingzheng Xina: Guanyu “Waijianü” Shangfang de Tizhi 
Jieshi (论法治剩余的行政吸纳—关于”外嫁女”上访的体制解释) [On Administrative Absorption of Legal 
Residues: Institutional Interpretation of the Petition of “Out-Married Women” to Higher Authorities] 
KĀIFÀNG SHÍDÀI (开放时代) [OPEN TIMES] 164, 165 (2017). 
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legislation.97 Due to these factors, it is believed that courts are not always able 
to make decisions solely on the basis of law when adjudicating these types of 
disputes.98 Courts find it difficult to come up with a logical ruling when there 
are gaps in the law. 99 They find it equally difficult to reconcile the 
inconsistencies between village internal rules and national laws, 100 and to 
enforce judgments against a defiant village collective.101 Some courts choose 
 
97. See Hong Luo ( 罗 虹 ) & Hongwu Zhong ( 钟 宏 武 ), Zhiyue Woguo Nongcun Funü Tudi Quanyi 
Baohu de Faxue Fenxi ( 制约我国农村妇女土地权益保护的法学分析 ) [Regulating the Protection of 
Women’s Rights and Interests in China] GĀNSÙ SHÈHUÌ KĒXUÉ (甘肃社会科学) [GANSU SOC. SCI.] 162, 162 
(2006). See generally Li & Yin-Sheng, supra note 75 (explaining that policy and law do not do enough to 
close the gender gap women suffer in traditional farming areas); Liaw, supra note 86 (arguing that, despite the 
proper framework to guarantee women rights in land, courts are not properly enforcing the law to actually 
strengthen these rights). 
98. See Chunrong Shang (商春荣) & Yueheng Zhang (张岳恒), Dangqian Woguo Nongcun Funü Tudi 
Quanli Baozhang Jizhi Yanjiu (当前我国农村妇女土地权利保障机制研究) [An Analysis on the Current 
Mechanisms of Protecting Rural Women’s Land Rights in China] HUÁZHŌNG NÓNGYÈ DÀXUÉ XUÉBÀO 
(SHÈHUÌ KĒXUÉ BǍN) (华中农业大学学报 (社会科学版)) [J. HUAZHONG AGRIC. U. (SOC. SCI. EDITION)] 95, 
96 (2010); see also Hou, supra note 81, at 54; Changjian Li (李长健) & Qiaoyun Zhang (张巧云), Woguo 
Nongcun  Funü  Tudi  Quanyi  Baohu  Zhidu  de  Wanshan  ( 我国农村妇女土地权益保护制度的完善 ) 
[Recommendations for Perfecting the Protection of China’s Rural Women’s Land Rights and Interests] HUÁZH 
Ō NG NÓNGYÈ DÀXUÉ XUÉBÀO (SHÈHUÌ KĒ XUÉ BǍN)) (华中农业大学学报(社会科学版)) [J. HUAZHONG 
AGRIC. U. (SOC. SCI. EDITION)] 77, 80 (2013); Fuzhong Yang (杨福荣), Falü zai Nongcun bei Bianyuan hua 
Wenti Yanjiu: Yi Waijianü Quanyi Jiufen Wei Qierudian de Chubu Kaocha (法律在农村被边缘化问题研究 
——以外嫁女权益纠纷为切入点的初步考察) [Research About Problems of Legal Marginalization in 
China Rural Areas – A Preliminary Study on the Disputes Involving the Rights of Married-Out Women]  
FǍXUÉ ZÁZHÌ (法学杂志) [LAW SCI. MAG.] 82, 82 (2010). 
99. Liu & Wan, supra note 90; see also Yi Chen (陈屹) & Xiang Gao (高翔), Nongye Chengbao Hetong 
Anjian Shenli Qingkuang ji Falü Shiyong Yanjiu: Dui Chongqing Shi Bufen Nongye Chengbao Hetong Anjian 
de Fenxi (农业承包合同案件审理情况及法律适用研究：对重庆市部分农业承包合同案件的调查分析) 
[Adjudication and the Application of Law in Agricultural Contract Cases: Investigations into Agricultural 
Contract Cases], FǍLǛ SHÌYÒNG  ( 法 律 适 用 ) [J.L. APPL.] [Erlinglingliu Nian Shiyue[Oct. 2006], at 48; Fei 
Gao (高飞), Nongcun Funü Tudi Quanyi Baohu de Kunjing yu Duice Tanxi (农村妇女土地权益保护的困境 
与对策探析) [Discussion on the Difficulties on Protecting the Rights and Interests of Rural Women in Terms 
of Land and Countermeasures], 23 ZHŌNGGUÓ TǓDÌ KĒXUÉ ( 中 国 土 地 科 学 ) [CHINA LAND SCI.] 47, 50 
(2009); Li & Yan, supra note 79, at 27; Hailong Sun ( 孙 海 龙 ) et al., Chengshihua Beijing Xia Nongcun 
Waijianü Quanyi Jiufen jiqi Jiejue Jizhi de Sikao (城市化背景下农村”外嫁女”权益纠纷及其解决机制的思
考 ) [Thoughts of Married-Out-Women’s Rights Disputes and Resolution in Rural Area in the Context of 
Urbanization] FǍLǛ SHÌYÒNG (法律适用) [LAW APPL.] 26, 30 (2004). 
100. Chen & Gao, supra note 99, at 49; see also Lanzhi Bo ( 柏 兰 芝 ), Jiti de Chonggou: Zhujiang 
Sanjiaozhou Diqu Nongcun Chanquan Zhidu de Yanbian: Yi “Waijianü” Zhengyi wei Li (集体的重构:珠江三
角洲地区农村产权制度的演变—以”外嫁女”争议为例) [Reconstruction of the Collective: The Evolution of 
Property in Rural Area of Pearl River Delta—A Case Study on Married-Out-Women Disputes] KĀIFÀNG 
SHÍDÀI (开放时代) [OPEN TIMES] 109, 121 (2013); Jialiang Huang (黄家亮) & Liufen Wu (吴柳芬), Duoyuan 
Zhengyi Xia de Xingdong Luoji yu Jiufen Jiejue: Zhujiang Sanjiaozhou “Waijianü” Jiufen Shizheng Yanjiu (多
元正义下的行动逻辑与纠纷解决——珠江三角洲”外嫁女”纠纷实证研究) [Action Logic and Dispute 
Resolution Under the Pluralist Justice——An Empirical Research on the Dispute of “Married Daughters” in 
the Countryside of Pearl River Delta], 37 GUǍNGXĪ MÍNZÚ DÀXUÉ XUÉBÀO (ZHÉXUÉ SHÈHUÌ KĒXUÉ BǍN)     
(广西民族大学学报(哲学社会科学版)) [J. GUANGXI U. NATIONALITIES (PHIL. SOC. SCI. EDITION)] 10, 11 
(2015). 
101. Xiaoyun Mo (莫小云), Guangzhou Shi Baiyun Qu Nongcun Waijianü Jingji Quanyi Baohu de Sikao 
(广州市白云区农村外嫁女经济权益保护的思考) [Thoughts of Protection of Rural Married-Out-Women in 
Baiyun District, Guangzhou City] NÁNFĀNG JĪNGJÌ (南方经济) [SOUTH CHINA ECON.] 30, 31(2003); see also 
Sun et al., supra note 99, at 30; Xia, supra note 82, at 88. 
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to reject the disputes before they can be docketed.102 In some regions, such as 
in Guangdong Province, courts began to accept MOW cases, but required the 
MOW to first seek administrative remedies.103 If the MOW were dissatisfied 
with the administrative decision, they could then take the matter to court as an 
administrative case.104 
B. EXISTING LITERATURE GAP ON THE MARRIED-OUT WOMEN ISSUE 
Previous qualitative research focused on the following aspects of the 
MOW issue: (1) the ramifications of the lack of civil remedies for MOW and 
various ways to protect MOW land rights when civil remedies were 
unavailable (for example, by introducing shareholding cooperatives);105 (2) the 
suppression of rural women’s rights in traditional Chinese culture; 106 (3) 
MOW’s weak position under China’s rural land policy and land ownership 
 
102. Wanyou Mo (莫万友), Nongcun Waijianü Quanyi Baohu Wenti Tanxi: Zhusanjiao Z Shi de Shizheng 
(农村外嫁女权益保护问题探析——珠三角 Z 市的实证) [On Protection of Rights and Interests of Rural 
Married-Out-Women: An Empirical Study on Z City in Pearl River Delta] NÓNGCŪN JĪNGJÌ  (农村经济) 
[RURAL ECON.] 94, 97 (2013). 
103. Mingyong Yu (余明永) et al., Waijianü de Quanyi Baohu: Yi Guangzhou Shi Fayuan Feisu Zhixing 
Anjian de Shencha yu Zhixing wei Shijiao (外嫁女的权益保护——以广州市法院非诉执行案件的审查与执
行为视角) [Protection of Rights and Interests of Married-Out-Women: From the Perspective of Adjudication 
and Execution of Non-Litigation Execution Cases in Courts in Guangzhou] FǍZHÌ LÙNTÁN ( 法 治 论 坛 )  [F. 
RULE L.] 21, 22–23 (2014). 
104. Sun et al., supra note 99. 
105. See generally Meishan Jiang (姜美善)  & Chunrong Shang (商春荣), Nongcun Gufen Hezuozhi 
Fazhan zhong de Funü Tudi Quanyi (农村股份合作制发展中的妇女土地权益) [Women’s Land Rights and 
Interests in the Development of Rural Shareholding System] NÓNGCŪN JĪNGJÌ (农村经济) [RURAL ECON.] 23 
(2009) (discussing the trajectory of the development of shareholding cooperatives in rural China); Li & Zhang, 
supra note 98 (calling for pro-MOW legislative reform and legal aid for rural women); Luo & Zhong, supra 
note 97 (pointing out that the underlying factors contributing to the MOW problem are the lack of gender 
consideration in China’s land policy, the conflict between the policy to stabilize land ownership/use and the 
mobility  of  MOW,  the  tensions  between  village  autonomy  and  national  law,  and  the  absence  of  civil 
remedies); Chunrong Shang (商春荣), Dui Nongcun Funü Tudi Quanli Wenti de Jiexi (对农村妇女土地权利
问题的解析) [An Investigation of the Issue of Rural Women’s Right of Land], 24 SHÀNTÓU DÀXUÉ XUÉBÀO 
(RÉNWÉN SHÈHUÌ KĒXUÉ BǍN) (汕头大学学报(人文社会科学版)) [J. SHANTOU U. (HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. 
EDITION)] 56 (2008) (calling for the transformation of land rights into “shares” (股份化), the promotion of 
gender equality in rural governance, and the regulation of villagers’ charters); Shang & Zhang, supra note 98 
(suggesting greater government intervention in MOW disputes, clarifying the land rights of the MOW by 
legislation, reconciling the villagers’ charters and national law, and improving education for rural women); 
Wang & Li, supra note 64 (discussing the legislative (unclear rights-subjects), executive (lack of supervision 
over village organizations), and judicial (refusing to take on the disputes) dimensions of the MOW issue, 
suggesting that civil remedies, which were lacking, were crucial to resolving the problem). 
106. See generally Hou, supra note 81 (arguing that the villager’s charter was not only a set of written 
rules, but also the manifestation of the traditional community structure, and further opining that the more 
united a village was, the more powerful the villagers’ charter would be, which in turn meant increased 
difficulty for MOW to assert equal land rights); Jinwen Xia (夏锦文) & Xiaojie Chen (陈小洁), Quyu Fazhi 
Wenhua: Yiyi Chanshi, Yunxing Jili yu Fazhan Lujing (区域法治文化：意义阐释、运行机理与发展路径) 
(Area Culture of Rule of Law: Meaning, Mechanism and Development) FǍLǛ KĒXUÉ (XĪBĚI ZHÈNGFǍ DÀXUÉ 
XUÉBÀO) (法律科学(西北政法大学学报)) (SCI. L. (J. NORTHWEST U. POL. SCI. L.)) 3 (2015) (explaining that 
it  was  “area  legal  culture”  that  shaped  the  local  rural  governance  framework  that  either  protected  or 
discriminated against MOW, suggesting that mediation is the best tool to reconcile the tension between the 
national law and local customs). 
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system;107 (4) the conflict between national law and rural regulations/norms;108 
and (5) the function of the petition system (xinfang) in resolving MOW land 
disputes.109 
Previous quantitative research focused on: (1) gender inequality in the 
distribution of rural land;110 (2) the status quo of MOW’s rural land rights in 
China;111  (3) the relationship between the land policy that prohibits adjustment 
 
107. See generally Duanhong Chen ( 陈 端 洪 ), Paitaxing yu Tazhehua: Zhongguo Nongcun “Waijianü” 
Anjian de Caichanquan Fenxi (排他性与他者化:中国农村”外嫁女”案件的财产权分析) (Exclusivity and 
Alienation: Analysis on property rights in rural Married-Out-Women cases), 5 BĚIDÀ FǍLǛ PÍNGLÙN (北大法
律 评 论 ) [PEKING U. L. REV.] 321 (2003) (proposing a two-tier-comprehension of the “collective land right” 
and inverting “usufruct of land” ( 收 益 权 ) into “shares” ( 股 份 化 ) to resolve the problem); Chen and Gao, 
supra note 87 (explaining how individual women were ignored as rights-subjects in the process of “land 
approval” (土地确权), a national policy intending to provide stability in land management and delegating land 
rights to “households” (戶), instead of individuals); Tiejun Wen (温铁军), Nongmin Shehui Baozhang yu Tudi 
Zhidu Gaige (农民社会保障与土地制度改革) (Farmers’ Social Security and Land System Reform) XUÉXÍ 
YUÈKĀN (学习月刊) (STUD. MONTHLY) 20 (2006) (emphasizing that the fundamental function of rural land in 
China was to offer peasants with basic income and a decent livelihood). 
108. See generally Huang and Wang, supra note 81 (arguing that the government and courts should refrain 
from intervening in the affairs of the village collective and only interfere when there is procedural impropriety 
in the allocation of compensation); Tang, supra note 78 (suggesting reconciling national law with local rural 
customs, rather than rigidly executing the national law); Wang, Legal Discourse of Good Governance, supra 
note 81 (discussing the nature, function, and status of villagers’ charters from a historical perspective and 
emphasizing the tradition of village autonomy in Chinese history); Wang, Establishing Systems of Legal 
Protection, supra note 81 (arguing that MOW disputes were the result of traditional culture that discriminated 
against women, the lack of government supervision over the village collective, the lack of a clear mechanism 
to confirm rural collective membership, and the absence of civil remedies); Yang, supra note 98 (discussing 
the marginalization of law in rural areas in China and the weakness of the regime in governing rural areas, as 
well as emphasizing the need to strengthen the regime’s programme to improve farmers’ livelihood, reduce 
their dependence on the village collective, and narrow the developmental gap between villages). 
109. Gui, supra note 96 (observing that courts are not accepting MOW disputes as civil cases and arguing 
that the administrative authorities, under the petition system, are in a better position to handle MOW disputes 
because they have abundant resources and are usually more flexible in dealing with these kinds of matters). 
110. Ling Zhu (朱玲), Nongdi Fenpei Zhong de Xingbie Pingdeng Wenti (农地分配中的性别平等问题) 
(Gender Inequality in China’s Land Tenure System) JĪNGJÌ YÁNJIŪ ( 经 济 研 究 ) (ECON. RES. J.) 34 (2000) 
(discovering, through extensive fieldwork, that marriage was the most common reason that causes rural 
women to lose land, that rural women’s entitlement to land is determined primarily by the village collective, 
and that the richer the village, the higher the likelihood that rural women will be allocated land rights). 
111. See generally Jianyong Li (李建勇) & Liyuan Cao (曹力元), Jingji Shehui Bianqian Shiyu zhong de 
Tudi Chengbao Jingyingquan Zhidu de Wanshan (经济社会变迁视阈中的土地承包经营权制度的完善) 
[Improvement of the System for the Right of Land Contractual Operation in Changes of Economy and Society], 
26 SHĀNXĪ GĀODĚNG XUÉXIÀO SHÈHUÌ KĒXUÉ XUÉBÀO  (山西高等学校社会科学学报) (SOC. SCI. J. U. 
SHANXI)  57  (2014) (arguing  that  the infringement  of land  rights  was  most severe when  MOW  married to 
distant villages); Luo, Zheng, and Huang, supra note 76 (arguing that traditional culture, the lack of rights 
consciousness and the failure of courts to enforce national laws were the main causes of rural women 
landlessness in Fujian Province); Wenrong Qian (钱文荣) & Yingchun Mao (毛迎春), Zhongguo Nongcun 
Funü Tudi Quanli Wenti de Shizheng Yanjiu (中国农村妇女土地权利问题的实证研究) (An Empirical Study 
of Land Rights of Rural Women in China), 35 ZHÈJIĀNG DÀXUÉ XUÉBÀO (RÉNWÉN SHÈ KĒ BǍN) (浙江大学学
报(人文社科版)) (J. ZHEJIANG U. (HUMAN. & SOC. SCI.)) 21 (2005) (arguing that rural women would easily 
lose their land rights as a result of migration and marriage); Jingxin Wang (王景新), Zhongguo Nongcun Funü 
Tudi Quanli:  Yiyi, Xianzhuang, Qushi (中国农村妇女土地权利：意义、现状、趋势) (Land Rights of 
Chinese Rural Women: Significance,  Status and Trends)  ZHŌNGGUÓ  NÓNGCŪN  JĪNGJÌ  ( 中国农村经济 ) 
(CHINESE RURAL ECON.) 25 (2003) (arguing that traditional culture and the lack of women’s participation in 
social and political affairs in the rural community are the main causes of women’s disadvantageous position in 
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to rural land entitlements and landlessness of rural women; 112 and (4) the 
impact of villagers’ charters on rural women’s land rights.113 
To date, no quantitative research has been conducted on MOW civil 
lawsuits, a gap that this Article intends to fill. 
 
C. CHINA’S CEDAW OBLIGATIONS ON MARRIED-OUT WOMEN 
China is under an obligation to protect the land rights of MOW (who are 
considered “rural women”) under the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). 114 China’s formal 
dialogue with the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW Committee), which arises out of 
China’s reporting obligation under CEDAW, did not produce any conclusive 
evidence that MOW are being treated fairly and equally in the distribution of 
government compensation following rural land expropriations. China  
presented its Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic Report to the CEDAW 
Committee (7/8 Reports) at the 59th Session of the CEDAW Committee in 
Geneva in 2014.115 The 7/8 Reports are the latest reports submitted by China to 




rural land ownership; also observing that while rural women were aware of their rights being infringed, they 
rarely resort to legal remedies); Yawei Zhang ( 张 雅 维 ) et al., Shandong Sheng Nongcun Funü Tudi Quanyi 
Diaocha Fenxi (山东省农村妇女土地权益调查分析) (An Investigation Analysis of Rural Women’s Land 
Rights in Shandong) SHĀNDŌNG NǙZǏ DÀXUÉ XUÉBÀO (山东女子大学学报) [J. SHANDONG WOMEN’S U.] 18 
(2011) (arguing that most rural women would not take their land disputes to court, as most courts do not accept 
these types of cases anyway). 
112. See generally Chuanhao Tian ( 田 传 浩 ) & Jia Chen ( 陈 佳 ), Jingzhi Tudi Tiaozheng yu Funü Tudi 
Quanli Baozhang: Jiyu Zhejiang he Shaanxi de Jingyan (禁止土地调整与妇女土地权利保障——基于浙江
和 陕 西 的 经 验 ) [The Prohibition of Rural Land Readjustment and the Protection of Women’s Land Rights: 
Evidence from Zhejiang and Shaanxi Province], 12 JĪNGJÌ XUÉ (经济学) (CHINA ECON. Q.) 719 (2013) 
(discussing how rural women lose land as a result of changing their residence, typically when they marry and 
move to live with their husbands). 
113. Senwei Huang ( 黄 森 慰 ) et al., Nongcun Funü Tudi Quanyi, Jiating Shouru yu Tudi Zhengce: Jiyu 
Fujian Sheng Diaocha Shuju (农村妇女土地权益、家庭收入与土地政策——基于福建省调查数据) (Land 
Rights of Rural Women, Incomes of Families and Land Policies: Based on Investigations into Fujian 
Province), 22 ZHŌNGGUÓ NÓNGYÈ DÀXUÉ XUÉBÀO  (中国农业大学学报) (J. CHINA AGRIC. U.) 213, 216 
(2017) (arguing that discrimination was not overwhelming—with 77.57% of respondents answering that  there 
was “[n]o such discriminating charter”—the villagers’ charters undermine the families’ economic status by 
decreasing the area of farmland of those affected families). 
114. G.A. Res. 34/180, at 15–16 (Dec. 18, 1979). See, in particular, Comm. on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 32 on the Rights of Rural Women, Arts. 14 
and 15(2), CEDAW/C/GC/34 (Mar. 4, 2016) [hereinafter General Recommendation No. 32]. Under the 
General Recommendation on the Rights of Rural Women of the CEDAW Committee, which state parties must 
follow, the following was highlighted: “[s]tates parties should ensure that legislation guarantees rural women’s 
rights to land, water and other natural resources, on an equal basis with men, irrespective of their civil and 
marital status or a male guardian/guarantor, and that they have full legal capacity.” General Recommendation 
No. 32, at 17. 
115. The session was held between October 20 and November 7, 2014. 
116. China was due to submit its Ninth Report to the CEDAW Committee on November 1, 2018, but to 
date no report has been submitted. See UN Treaty Body Database, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE 
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resolve the issue of land contract disputes involving rural women.117 China 
pointed to a number of key statutes that provided protection to the rights of 
women in rural land contracting and ensured that there is court access if such 
rights are infringed.118 It was reported that various state organs carried out 
special programs to ensure that the relevant statutory provisions that provide 
protection to the rights of women in rural land contracting were enforced.119 
Regarding the persistent problem of rural women being deprived of 
compensation in rural land expropriation, the 7/8 Reports explained that 
special efforts had been made to strengthen the regulation of the distribution 
and use of the land acquisition compensation fees. 120 In its Concluding 
Observations, the CEDAW Committee was still concerned that “a high 
proportion of women in rural areas are still left without contracted land,”121  
and called upon China to “eliminate all barriers which restrict women’s access 
to land, particularly in rural areas, and ensure that the mediation and settlement 
of such disputes afford women effective remedies.”122 China is due to report on 
measures that it has taken to implement the above recommendations in the 
upcoming reporting cycle.123 
 
III. DATA, METHODOLOGY, AND VARIABLES 
 
A. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
In an effort to make the Chinese judiciary more transparent, many courts 
in China now make their “documents of adjudication decisions”124 (DADs) 
available to the public, and they are searchable online.125 This opens up an 
invaluable research resource for empirical work on Chinese courts through 
coding and analyzing the DADs.126 Using the China Judgments Online search 
system, a search was conducted on March 21, 2018 for the purpose of the 
 
OF THE COMM’R, http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Countries.aspx?CountryCode=CHN 
&Lang=EN (last visited Nov. 6, 2019). 
117. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations on the 
Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic Reports of State Parties: State Parties: State Parties: China, 
CEDAW/C/CHN/CO/7-8 (Nov. 7, 2014) [hereinafter 7/8 Reports]. 
118. Id. at 3, 9 (referencing specifically the Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests and 
Property Law). 
119. Id. at 2. 
120. Id. at 9. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. The next session of the Committee is the 75th Session (Feb. 10, 2020–Feb. 28, 2020, but China is not 
on the agenda. 
124. In Chinese: caipan wenshu (裁判文书). 
125. This Article uses the China Judgments Online (http://wenshu.court.gov.cn/) search engine, which 
holds one of the most comprehensive repositories of DADs online. 
126. For previous empirical studies of DADs in China, see, e.g., He & Su, supra note 2; see also He and 
Lin, supra note 55. While there is no system of stare decisis in China, DADs will slowly gain some normative 
influence over subsequent cases as parties are now in a position to check whether their judge is deviating from 
previous decisions. 
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present study. In the search, the search terms “married-out women” (外嫁女) 
and “Collective Economic Organization” (集体经济组织成员权益) were used 
in a whole document search, and the search was limited to “judgments” (判决) 
of “first-instance” ( 一 审 ) in “civil cases” ( 民 事 ) at “grassroots courts,” also 
known as “basic-level courts” (基层法院). The search results contained 3579 
DADs, which covers the time period between 2009 and 2017.127 Eighty-one 
DADs were dropped for being duplicates. The resulting dataset contains 3498 
DADs. To ensure the sample presents the same temporal and regional structure 
of the population, the 3498 cases were assigned into different groups in 
accordance with the year of the decision and the province where the court 
belongs. The identified DADs were then randomly sampled. A sample of 1166 
cases was selected, which is one-third of the population. After examining the 
DADs, a codebook was created with a list of variables. Then, the information 
from the DADs was hand-coded into a computer. Forty-four DADs were 
dropped as they were unrelated to MOW’s land rights. A further 257 DADs 
were dropped because the cases involved only the MOW’s spouses or children, 
while the MOW themselves were not the claimants. An additional seven DADs 
were dropped, of which two were duplicates, three contained no information 
on the outcome of the case, and two were retrial cases, which were not within 
the scope of this study because this study focuses only on first instance cases. 
The final number for the DADs analysis was 858.128 
The DADs analysis is supplemented by semi-structured interviews with 
four informants who are judges and a legal practitioner with experience in 
handling MOW disputes.129 The informants come from Jiangxi, Guangdong, 
Shaanxi and Beijing. The selection provides diversity in regional variation and 
professional experience. 
 
B. HOW DOES ONE DETERMINE WINNING AND LOSING? 
The following metrics are adopted to determine whether the plaintiff 
(MOW litigant) is winning through a complete win or partial win, or losing. 
 
 
127. DADs from 2018 were dropped because the complete set of DADs for 2018 was unavailable at the 
time of the search (March 21, 2018). The DADs prior to 2009 were also dropped because only two cases were 
available online. 
128. In some of the crosstabs analyses below, the chi-square test is not applicable due to the lack of 
sufficient number of cases in each cell. 
129. The informant from Jiangxi Province is a forty-one-year-old male judge who works at a basic-level 
court in Jiangxi Province. The Author got in touch with this informant through a personal contact at the Higher 
People’s Court of Jiangxi Province. This informant has experience in handling MOW lawsuits. The informant 
from Guangdong Province is a thirty to forty-year-old female judge who works at a basic-level court in 
Guangdong Province. She is a personal contact of the author, and she has some experience in handling MOW 
disputes. The informant from Shaanxi Province is a female judge, approximately fifty years old, who works at 
a basic-level court in Shaanxi Province. She is a personal contact of the author, and she has extensive 
experience in handling MOW disputes. The informant from Beijing is a practicing thirty-eight-year-old male 
lawyer. He runs a small firm in Beijing, which is well known in China for assisting MOW litigants. He is a 
personal contact of the author. 
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For monetary claims, a “complete win” means the plaintiff is awarded the 
full amount claimed and the court confirms her status as member of the village 
collective. Any of the following situations would be regarded as a “partial 
win:” (1) plaintiff recovered the full amount of the monetary claim, but the 
court does not confirm the plaintiff’s membership status; (2) plaintiff  
recovered a partial amount of the monetary claim and the court confirms 
plaintiff’s membership status; (3) plaintiff recovered a partial amount of the 
monetary claim and the court does not confirm plaintiff’s membership status; 
or (4) plaintiff is not awarded any monetary amount, but the court confirms the 
plaintiff’s membership status. For monetary claims, only when the plaintiff is 
not awarded any monetary amount and the court does not confirm the 
plaintiff’s membership status would it be considered a “loss” for the plaintiff. 
Non-monetary claims are actions requesting the court only to confirm the 
plaintiff’s status as member of the village collective, without any claim for 
monetary compensation relating to the land expropriation. If the court confirms 
the plaintiff’s membership status, in which case the plaintiff’s Share of 
Litigation Fees (SLF) is 0 percent, it is considered a “complete win.” If the 
court did not confirm the plaintiff’s membership status, in which case the 
plaintiff’s SLF is 100 percent, it is considered a “loss.” There will be no 
“partial win” for non-monetary claims. 
 
C. INTRODUCTION TO THE VARIABLES 
An analysis will be conducted to identify the variations of the MOW’s 
success rates by a number of relevant independent variables: (1) party capacity; 
(2) MOW’s connections with the villages; (3) legal representation; (4) law and 
regulations of the state; (5) village internal rules; (6) previous dispute 
resolution; and (7) procedural variables. 
Party capacity encompasses variables such as the age, occupation, and 
place of residence (either rural or urban) of the plaintiff, as well as the 
institutional structure of the defendant and the number of defendants (single or 
multiple). The role of lawyers in the variation of the outcome will be 
examined.130 For a MOW to acquire membership status of the rural collective, 
she must demonstrate connection with the village 131 Given the divergent 
standards adopted by courts in determining “connection,” it would be 
interesting to see how different types of “connections” play out in the 




130. See, e.g., John Szmer et al., Does the Lawyer Matter: Influencing Outcomes on the Supreme Court of 
Canada, 41 LAW & SOC. REV. 279, 298 (2007) (“Litigation team experience and size affect the Court’s 
decisionmaking, even after controlling for several factors, including ideology and party capability.”). 
131. Wen, supra note 107, at 20. 
132. These connections that MOW litigants have with the natal village were selected because they 
appeared repeatedly in the sampled DADs. These connections are likely to be considered relevant in the 
court’s determination of membership status of the MOW. 
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determine village collective membership,133 a plethora of national laws either 
directly or indirectly protect the land rights of the MOW.134 Provincial judicial 
rules that favor MOW rights were believed to be an important factor in shaping 
the attitude of lower courts.135 It is also valuable to understand how courts 
interpret village internal rules (villagers’ charters) and the resulting variation of 
the outcome.136 Furthermore, the data will also allow one to determine whether 
previous court decisions, administrative rulings, and citizens’ petitions are 
significant in the variation of the outcome. Procedural variables—like trial in 
absentia and burden of proof—will also be applied. 
 




1. Temporal Variations 
Temporal variations are explored as part of the overview of the data.137 In 
terms of the MOW’s success rates by the year of the court decision, 2015 had 
the highest rate of frequency, and 2009 had the lowest rate of frequency. Using 
the losing rate as the benchmark, it appears that an upward trend can be 
identified during the period between 2012 and 2016.138 Looking at the rate of 
frequency, there was an explosion of lawsuits from 2014 to 2016.139 The high 





133. See supra text accompanying notes 22–26. 
134. See supra text accompanying note 18. 
135. Guanyu Shenli Nongcun Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Shouyi Fenpei Jiufen Anjian de Huiyi Jiyao (关于审理农
村集体经济组织收益分配纠纷案件的会议纪要) (Minutes of a Meeting about Adjudicating Cases of 
Disputes on Allocation of Rural Economic Collective Incomes) (promulgated by the High Ct. Chongqing 
Municipality, May 31, 2009, effective May 31, 2009) (Westlaw China). 
136. The villagers’ charter is the “internal constitution” of the village community and is usually 
unpublished. Villagers’ charters in many rural communities violate state law. A common criticism of villagers’ 
charters is that they are being used as a tool to control villagers, instead of being used to instill the core values 
of the village community and protect the rights of its members. In many cases, the villagers’ charter was used 
as a ground to defeat MOW’s claims in court. How courts interpret these laws and villagers’ charters—and 
whether the outcome is significantly varied by the interpretation—are important information that helps an 
individual better read the MOW issue. 
137. See infra Table 1. 
138. The MOW litigants’ losing rate first increased in 2013 (from 0% in 2012 to 3.03% in 2013). The 
losing rate continued to spike in 2014 (6.50%), came down slightly in 2015 (6.33%), and then shot up again in 
2016 (10.80%). The interesting phenomenon is that the losing rate came down drastically in 2017 (1.23%). 
139. In 2013, there were only thirty-three cases nationwide (3.85%). In 2014, the frequency skyrocketed to 
200 cases (23.31%). It stayed at this elevated level during 2015 (221 cases, 25.76%) and 2016 (213 cases, 
24.83%), until it dropped to 162 cases (18.88%) in 2017. 
140. The explosion in the number of lawsuits suggests that the volume of MOW disputes skyrocketed 
during this period. One possible explanation is that, when more people sued, it encouraged others with less 
meritorious claims to bring lawsuits as well. 
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TABLE 1: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY THE YEAR OF COURT DECISION 
 
Year of decisions Frequency Complete win Partial win Loss 
2017 18.88% 85.80% 12.96% 1.23% 
2016 24.83% 75.59% 13.62% 10.80% 
2015 25.76% 76.47% 17.19% 6.33% 
2014 23.31% 70.00% 23.50% 6.50% 
2013 3.85% 75.76% 21.21% 3.03% 
2012 1.75% 80.00% 20.00% 0.00% 
2011 0.82% 85.71% 14.29% 0.00% 
2010 0.70% 66.67% 33.33% 0.00% 
2009 0.12% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
 
 
2. Regional Variations 
Mapping MOW litigants’ success rates across provinces may reveal 
interesting patterns. Courts in each province may adopt different approaches to 
MOW cases due to policy or case management reasons. Local rules and the 
policies of provincial high courts on MOW disputes may also differ.141 The 
divergence in economic development may also affect how courts in different 
provinces treat MOW cases. 
Hunan had the highest rate of frequency during the period of 2009–2017, 
while Hebei, Jiangsu, Jiangxi and Liaoning had the lowest rate of frequency.142 
The provinces with the lowest losing rates were Chongqing, Gansu, Inner 
Mongolia, Hebei, Jiangsu and Liaoning. 143 The province with the highest 





141. For instance, a policy document issued by the Shaanxi Provincial High Court made it clear that the 
MOW would lose their membership status in their natal village collective if: (1) the litigant’s actual residence 
was not in the village; (2) the litigant’s primary source of income was not from the village; or (3) the litigant 
failed to make contributions to the village. See Guanyu Shenli Nongcun Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Shouyi Fenpei Jiufen 
Anjian Taolunhui Jiyao (关于审理农村集体经济组织收益分配纠纷案件讨论会纪要) (Minutes of a Session 
about Adjudicating Cases of Disputes on Allocation of Rural Economic Collective Incomes) (promulgated by 
the High Ct. Shaanxi Province, Jan. 6, 2006, effective Feb. 1, 2006) (Westlaw China). These disqualification 
provisions are not found in the policy document issued by the Anhui Provincial High Court. See Guanyu Chuli 
Nongcun Tudi Jiufen Anjian De Zhidao Yijian (关于处理农村土地纠纷案件的指导意见) (Guideline about 
Handling Disputes on Rural Land) (promulgated by the High Ct. Anhui Province, Dec. 27, 2004, effective Jan. 
1, 2005) (Westlaw China). 
142. See infra Table 2. 
143. Hebei, Jiangsu, and Liaoning also have the lowest rate of frequency (0.12%). See infra Table 2. 
144. But note that Shanxi has the second lowest rate of frequency (0.23%). See infra Table 2. 
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TABLE 2: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES ACROSS PROVINCES (N=858) 
Province Frequency Complete win Partial win Loss 
GDP/Capita (unit: RMB) 
 
Jiangsu (96887) 0.12% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Zhejiang (84916) 7.11% 57.38% 32.79% 9.84% 
Fujian (74707) 12.59% 70.37% 17.59% 12.04% 
Guangdong (74016) 15.62% 72.39% 25.37% 2.24% 
Inner Mongolian (72064) 0.35% 66.67% 33.33% 0.00% 
Chongqing (58502) 1.17% 70.00% 30.00% 0.00% 
Shaanxi (51015) 5.48% 65.96% 19.15% 14.89% 
Liaoning (50791) 0.12% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Hunan (46382) 35.08% 81.40% 16.28% 2.33% 
Hainan (44347) 15.97% 89.78% 6.57% 3.65% 
Hebei (43062) 0.12% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Henan (42575) 0.58% 40.00% 40.00% 20.00% 
Jiangxi (40400) 0.12% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
Sichuan (40003) 0.47% 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 
Anhui (39561) 1.40% 66.67% 0.00% 33.33% 
Guangxi (38027) 3.26% 85.71% 3.57% 10.71% 
Shanxi (35532) 0.23% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
Gansu (27643) 0.23% 50.00% 50.00% 0.00% 
 
 
3. Economic Factors: MOW’s Success Rates Across Four GDP Per 
Capita Clusters 
To measure the variation across provinces of similar economic strength in 
terms of GDP per capita, 145 the provinces are assigned into four different 





145. The latest official GDP per capita data of provinces available in China run up to 2016. See National 
Data, NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA (last visited Nov. 6, 2019) 
http://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=E0103. 
146. The four clusters are: (a) not less than RMB20000, but less than RMB40000 per capita; (b) not less 
than RMB40000, but less than RMB60000 per capita; (c) not less than RMB60000, but less than RMB80000 
per capita; and (d) not less than RMB80000, but less than RMB100000 per capita. 
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TABLE 3: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY GDP CLUSTERS 
(N=858) 
GDP per capita* Frequency Complete win Partial win Loss 
(Unit: RMB1000) 
[80, 100) 7.23% 58.06% 32.26% 9.68% 
[60, 80) 28.55% 71.43% 22.04% 6.53% 
[40, 60) 58.86% 81.39% 14.26% 4.36% 
[20, 40) 5.36% 73.91% 6.52% 19.57% 
*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=39.460, *P=0.000(<0.01). 
 
From the data,147 it can be concluded that the region with the weakest 
economic development (GDP Per Capita Cluster (RMB20000–40000)) is least 
favorable to MOW litigants because it has the highest losing rate.148 
While one may expect that the more economically developed the region 
is, the lower the losing rate would be,149 we find that the cluster with the 
highest GDP per capita value (GDP Per Capita Cluster (RMB80000–100000)) 
is second least favorable to MOW litigants (with the second highest losing 
rate). A possible explanation from an economic perspective is that 
economically developed regions provide more non-agricultural work 
opportunities and, as such, the value of the rural land (and/or its derivative 
interests) was comparatively less significant in sustaining the MOW’s 
livelihood. On this basis, the court may find less connection between  the 
MOW and their natal village.150 
The MOW litigant’s success rates varied significantly across the different 
GDP Per Capita Clusters (chi-square=39.460, P=0.000). 
 
B. THE “HAVE-NOTS” CAME OUT AHEAD 
 
1.  MOW Litigants (“Have-Nots”) Are Winning By a Substantial 
Margin 
The findings show that MOW litigants are winning by a substantial 
margin.151 Out of the 858 sampled cases, the MOW litigants won 93.90% of 
the time, combining “complete win” (76.50%) and “partial win” (17.40%). The 
MOW litigant only lost 6.20% of the time. 
 
 
147. See supra Table 3. 
148. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that, in poorer regions, there is less awareness for 
protecting women’s rights, and women are generally less educated and usually occupy a weaker position in 
society vis-à-vis their counterparts in more developed regions. For these reasons, courts in poorer regions may 
see less of an obligation to enforce MOW property rights. 
149. The proposition would be that MOW litigants in economically advanced regions tend to be more 
educated, resourceful, and rights conscious. 
150. Zhu, supra note 110, at 38. 
151. See infra Table 4. 
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656 76.50% 76.50% 













100% 656 77.63% 
(75%, 100%) 62 7.34% 
(50%, 75%] 28 3.31% 
(25%, 50%] 23 2.72% 
(0%, 25%] 10 1.18% 
0% 66 7.81% 
Total 845 100% 
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2. Monetary Claims: Recovery Rate, Average Claim, and Average 
Award 
The rate of recovery by the MOW litigants in monetary claims, excluding 
non-monetary claims, (n=845) are on the high side, with 77.63% of the MOW 
litigants recovering the full amount (recovered 100%) of their claims.152 
The data shows (n=845) that the mean and median values of the average 
monetary claim are RMB55509.09 and RMB22745.95, respectively, with 
standard deviation at RMB110682.73.153 The data shows the mean and median 
values of the average monetary award are RMB48643.65 and RMB17500.00, 
respectively, with standard deviation at RMB108310.58. The data shows the 
mean and median values of the recovery rates of monetary claims are 0.8784 












152. See supra Table 4. 
153. See infra Table 5. 
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TABLE 5: STATISTICS ON MONETARY CLAIMS 
(N=845) 
 
 Mean Median SD 
Average monetary claim 55509.09 22745.95 110682.73 
Average monetary award 48643.65 17500.00 108310.58 




3.  Judicial Confirmation of the MOW’s Village Collective Membership 
Status 
From the data (n=849), the court confirmed the MOW’s membership 
status 92.46% of the time. In 3.77% of the cases, the court denied the MOW’s 
membership status.154 For cases that confirmed the MOW’s membership status, 
83.31% were complete wins, and 16.69% were partial wins. By definition, no 
MOW litigant had lost under this situation. This is contrasted with the 
substantially lower success rate in cases where the court denied the MOW’s 
membership status: 0% (complete win), 6.25% (partial win), and 93.75% 
(loss). 
For cases where the court deferred the decision of membership status to 
the village collective, the MOW partially won 60% of the time and lost 40% of 
the time. This seems paradoxical at first glance, as confirming membership 
status seems to be a consistent basis for courts awarding compensation. The 
high partial win rate means that the court awarded monetary compensation to 
the MOW litigants despite deferring the question of membership status to the 
village collective. From reviewing the reasoning in the DADs in this category, 
the court had in fact impliedly accepted the MOW’s membership status, but it 
was not prepared to formally confirm the MOW’s membership status, stating 





154. See infra Table 6. 
155. For a particular case that illustrates this, see Yuangao Zhang Lihui Su Beigao Changsha Shi Yuhua 
Qu Tiaoma Zhen Xiyu Cun Zhangjiawan Cunmin Xiaozu Yi Qinhai Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Chengyuan Quanyi Jiufen 
(原告张利辉诉被告长沙市雨花区跳马镇喜雨村张家湾村民小组以侵 害集体经济组织成员权益纠纷) 
[Zhang  Lihui  v. Zhangjiawan  Grp., Xiyu  Village, Tiaoma  Town, Yuhua Dist., Changsha City on Infringing 
Rights and Interests of Members of Econ. Collective] (Changsha Yuhua Dist. People’s Ct. June 13, 2016) 
(China). 
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TABLE 6: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY THE COURT’S DECISION ON MOW’S 
MEMBERSHIP STATUS (N=849) 
 
















Denied membership status 3.77% 0.00% 6.25% 93.75% 
Deferred to the village 
collective 
2.36% 0.00% 60.00% 40.00% 
Remained silent on the 
issue 
1.06% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
Declined to make any 
decision 





4. Whether “Village Autonomy” Was Mentioned in the Court Decision 
In adjudicating MOW lawsuits, the court may need to balance the 
interests of the MOW and the village collective.156 Courts that are inclined to 
respect “village autonomy” are usually more reluctant to apply national laws 
that favor the MOW and overturn decisions already made by the village 
collective.157 This hypothesis will be tested with the data. 
 
 
156. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Female, Judge, Shaanxi Province Basic-Level Court (Jan. 9, 
2019) [hereinafter Interview with Anonymous Female Judge in Shaanxi Province]. Courts in China frequently 
find themselves in a position of needing to consider the social impact of their decisions, especially for cases 
that could potentially upset the stability of the local community. Id. Court mediation is used by Chinese courts 
as a way to pacify the parties and alleviate the harshness of the zero-sum nature of litigation. Id. See generally 
PETER C.H. CHAN, MEDIATION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINESE CIVIL JUSTICE: A PROCEDURALIST DIACHRONIC 
PERSPECTIVE (2017) (analyzing the social agenda in Chinese civil adjudication). 
157. Interview with Anonymous Female Judge in Shaanxi Province, supra note 156; see also supra note 
129. For a case example of courts that have an inclination of respecting “village autonomy” that are usually 
more reluctant to apply national laws that favor the MOW, see Zheng Shaolu Yu Jinhua Shi Jindong Qu 
Xiaoshun Zhen Shitatou Cun Cunmin Weiyuanhui Qinhai Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Chengyuan Quanyi Jiufen Yishen 
Minshi Panjueshu (郑少路与金华市金东区孝顺镇石塔头村村民委员会侵害集体经济组织成员权益纠纷
一 审 民 事 判 决 书 ) [Zheng Shaolu v. Villager Comm. of Shitatou Village, Xiaoshun Town, Jindong Dist., 
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From the data (n=858), 90.68% of the cases did not mention “village 
autonomy” at all. Only 9.32% of the cases referred to “village autonomy.”158 
The MOW’s losing rate was much higher when the court mentioned “village 
autonomy.” Whether “village autonomy” was mentioned in the court decision 
significantly affected the variation of the outcome (chi-square=38.019, 
p=0.000).159 
 
TABLE 7: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY (1) WHETHER “VILLAGE AUTONOMY” 
WAS MENTIONED IN THE COURT DECISION; AND (2) WHETHER THE MOW HAD 
PREVIOUSLY AGREED TO THE COMPENSATION DISTRIBUTION ARRANGEMENT 
UNDER THE VILLAGERS’ CHARTER OR ALLOCATION AGREEMENT 
 





No 90.68% 79.05% 16.07% 4.88% 
Yes 9.32% 51.25% 30.00% 18.75% 
 
Whether the MOW agreed to 
the distribution arrangement 
under Villagers’ Charter or 
Allocation Agreement (n=28) 
No 35.71% 70.00% 10.00% 20.00% 
Yes 64.29% 38.89% 16.67% 44.44% 
 
*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=38.019, P=0.000 (<0.01). 
 
C. CAPACITY OF THE PLAINTIFF (MOW LITIGANT) 
 
1. Age Groups 
Four hundred and twenty-eight cases contained valid information on the 
age groups of the MOW.160 The age group from fifty to fifty-nine-years-old  
has the highest losing rate (8%), while the age group from sixty to sixty-nine- 
years-old and age group from seventy to seventy-nine-years-old have the 
lowest losing rates (0%). From the available data, it can be observed that the 
 
Jinhua City on Infringing Rights and Interests of Members of Econ. Collective] (Jinhua Jindong Dist. People’s 
Ct. Dec. 12, 2014) (China). 
158. See infra Table 7. Out of those cases that mentioned “village autonomy”, the MOW litigants’ success 
rates were: 51.25% (complete win), 30% (partial win) and 18.75% (loss). Out of those cases that did not 
mention “village autonomy,” the MOW litigants’ success rates were: 79.05% (complete win), 16.07% (partial 
win), and 4.88% (loss). 
159. See infra Table 7. 
160. See infra Table 8a. For cases where there are multiple plaintiffs, the first plaintiff’s age is recorded. 
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plaintiffs are predominantly from the younger generation (thirty to thirty-nine- 
years-old age group, with the rate of frequency of 65.89%). Very rarely would 
the plaintiff come from an older generation.161 
 
TABLE 8A: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY THE AGE GROUPS OF MOW 
(N=428) 
 
Age of MOW Frequency Complete win Partial win Loss 
30-39 65.89% 77.30% 16.31% 6.38% 
40-49 27.10% 72.41% 20.69% 6.90% 
50-59 5.84% 76.00% 16.00% 8.00% 
60-69 0.93% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
70-79 0.24% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 
2. Number of Plaintiffs in the Case 
 
TABLE 8B: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY SINGLE OR MULTIPLE PLAINTIFF(S) 
(MOW) (N=858) 
 
Single or multiple* Total Complete win Partial win Loss 
Single 71.33% 77.45% 15.69% 6.86% 
Multiple 28.67% 73.98% 21.54% 4.47% 
 
*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=5.368, P=0.068. 
 
Cases with a single plaintiff have a higher frequency than multiple 
plaintiffs, 162 which appears to confirm the reluctance of Chinese courts to 





161. MOW litigants, age thirty to age thirty-nine, have the highest frequency (65.89%). There are two 
possible reasons for this: first, MOW disputes arise from the rural women marrying out of the village and, 
second, as compared to older age groups, age thirty to age thirty-nine are more likely to get married (although, 
interestingly, the sample did not have any plaintiff younger than thirty). 
162. See supra Table 8b. 
163. Robin Hui Huang, Private Enforcement of Securities Law in China: A Ten-Year Retrospective and 
Empirical Assessment, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 757, 793 (2013). 
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3. Plaintiff’s Place of Residence at the Time of the Lawsuit 
Eight hundred fifty-eight cases contained valid information on the 
plaintiff’s place of residence at the time of the lawsuit,164 such as whether the 
MOW litigant resides in a rural or urban neighborhood.165 
In the data, plaintiffs residing in a rural neighborhood have a higher 
“losing rate” (7.85%) than plaintiffs residing in an urban neighborhood 
(6.25%). The data shows the plaintiff’s place of residence presented no 
significance in the variations of the outcome (chi-square=3.288, p=0.193). 
 
TABLE 8C: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY PLAINTIFF’S PLACE OF RESIDENCE (AT 
THE TIME OF THE LAWSUIT) AND OCCUPATION 
 


































100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 
Unemployed 9.23% 83.33% 16.67% 0.00% 
 
*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=3.288, (P=0.193). 
 
4. Categories of the Plaintiff 
In sixty-five cases,166 there contained valid information on the plaintiff’s 
categories.167 Peasants have the highest losing rate (6.38%),168 while the other 
three categories—migrant workers, 169 private business owners, and 
unemployed—are tied with the lowest losing rates (each at 0%). 
 
 
164. See infra Table 8c. 
165. Jize Jiang & Kai Kuang, Hukou Status and Sentencing in the Wake of Internal Migration: The 
Penalty Effect of Being Rural-to-Urban Migrants in China, 40 LAW & POL’Y 196, 197 (2018). 
166. See supra Table 8c. 
167. For cases with multiple plaintiffs, the first plaintiff’s occupation is recorded. 
168. In He and Su’s study, farmers also had the highest losing rate when matched against the government. 
He & Su, supra note 2, at 131. But one must look at this within the statistical context. In He and Su’s study, 
farmers lost 100%of all cases; here, the “peasants” only lost 6.38%. Id; see supra Table 8c. 
169. See Jiang & Kuang, supra note 165 (explaining the disparate legal treatment experienced by migrants 
in China). 
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The overwhelming majority of plaintiffs resided in a rural neighborhood 
at the time of the lawsuit (90.67%), which suggests that the MOW issue is a 
deeply rural issue, with most MOW marrying into other villages as opposed to 
moving into the cities. It is interesting to note that plaintiffs who were non- 
peasants did not lose a single case. 
 
D. CAPACITY OF THE DEFENDANT (VILLAGE COLLECTIVE) 
 
1. Single or Multiple Defendant(s) 
Most cases had single defendants (82.87%), with only 17.13% of cases 
having multiple defendants.170 The success rates of the MOW litigants are 
close in both situations. The data shows there are no significant variations of 
the outcome across the number of defendants in the case (chi-square=0.339, 
p=0.844). 
 
TABLE 9A: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY SINGLE OR MULTIPLE DEFENDANT(S) 
(N=858) 
 
Number of the 
defendant(s)* 
Total Complete win Partial win Loss 
Single 82.87% 76.09% 17.58% 6.33% 
Multiple 17.13% 78.23% 16.33% 5.44% 
 






















170. See infra Table 9a. 
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2. Institutional Nature of the Defendant 
 
TABLE 9B: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY THE PRINCIPAL DEFENDANT 
(N=857) 
 





Villagers’ Committee 11.55% 68.69% 18.18% 13.13% 
Villagers’ Group 70.48 % 77.98% 15.89% 6.13% 
Shareholding Economic 
Cooperative of the Village 
7.58% 78.46% 20.00% 1.54% 
(股份经济合作社)     
Neighborhood Community 1.40% 91.67% 0.00% 8.33% 
(居委会)     
Residents’ Group 8.05% 72.46% 26.09% 1.45% 
(居民小組)     
Villagers’ Economic Union 0.23% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
(经济联合社) 
    
Farm Production Team 0.35% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
(农场生产队) 
    




The MOW litigants lose more when they are up against the villagers’ 






171. See supra Table 9b. 
172. The villagers’ committee will only be named the principal defendant when it is in charge of the 
compensation allocation, which would only occur when the village group is unable to handle the allocation  
(for example, if it is unable to elect a leader to supervise the allocation process). Compared to the village 
group, the villagers’ committee is usually less connected to the immediate interests behind the allocation. It 
follows that the villagers’ committee is more impartial than the village group, which explains why it is harder 
to challenge the villagers’ committee’s decision in court. 
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E. MOW’S CONNECTION WITH THE NATAL VILLAGE 
From the data compiled in Table 10, with the exception of two 
“connection variables” (growing up in the village and possession of share 
certificate), 173 all other connections with the natal villages helped MOW’s 
cases.174 For example, the data reinforces the view that household registration 
(hukou)175 is critical in the determination of membership status of the MOW.176 
The same goes for social and medical insurance of the village collectives, 
which generally only cover individuals who are members of the collective.177 
Some courts also consider the birthplace of the MOW as a relevant factor in 
determining membership statuses.178 According to common practice,179 if the 
MOW were born in the village and one of their parents was a member, they 
would have acquired membership automatically at birth.180 The data shows that 
the MOW litigant’s success rate varied significantly by the MOW contracting 
land in the village (chi-square=27.186, p=0.000).181 The higher success rate for 
MOW litigants who had contracted land suggests that the productive use of 
village land by the MOW is a key factor that courts take into account.182 
For MOW litigants with existing land rights in the village, the court 
considers it a relevant factor if the MOW litigants rely on such rights as their 
primary source of income, whether they exercise such rights by way of 
engaging in agricultural activities, or receiving rental income if the land is 
rented out. Here, it seems the court makes an effort to protect MOW who are 
 
173. For village collectives that maintain “shareholding cooperatives,” the possession of a share certificate 
is considered a negative factor for the court in determining membership. 
174. See infra Table 10. 
175. Almost all provincial regulations require MOW’s household registration to be at the natal village as a 
prerequisite for attaining membership status. 
176. The enormous jump in the losing rate when MOW’s household registrations were not in the villages 
suggests that household registration tends to be a key factor that could sway the court’s decision. This is 
understandable, as the legal basis of MOW’s property rights stem from their status as members of the village 
collective, which can be (at least partly) reflected by their household registrations being in the villages. Only in 
very rare cases would the court award compensation to MOW who had moved their household registrations 
elsewhere. 
177. From the court’s perspective, confirmation that MOW are covered under the collectives’ social and 
medical insurance helps establish the membership status of MOW. 
178. Liu Mou Su Wangcheng Mou Shequ Qinfan Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Chengyuan Quanyi Jiufen An (刘某诉
望城某社区侵犯集体经济组织成员权益纠纷案) [Liu X v. X Cmty., Wangcheng Dist. on Infringing Rights 
and Interests of Members of Econ. Collective] (Wangcheng Dist. People’s Ct. Feb. 2, 2010) (China). 
179. See, e.g., Lü Meifang Su Nanning Shi Wuming Qu Chengxiang Zhen Datong Cun Di’er Cunmin 
Xiaozu Qinhai Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Chengyuan Quanyi Jiufen An (吕梅芳诉南宁市武鸣区城厢镇大同村第二村
民小组侵害集体经济组织成员权益纠纷案) [Lü Meifang v. Second Grp., Datong Village, Chengxiang Town, 
Wuming Dist., Nanning City on Infringing Rights and Interests of Members of Econ. Collective] (Nanning 
Wuming Dist. People’s Ct. Aug. 29, 2017) (China). 
180. In Chinese, yuanshi qude (原始取得). 
181. See infra Table 10. 
182. See, e.g., Peng Lili Su Yongxing Xian Chengguan Zhen Tongjiaowan Cun Pengjia Cunmin Xiaozu 
Qinfan Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Chengyuan Quanyi Jiufen An (彭丽丽诉永兴县城关镇铜角湾村彭家村民小组侵犯
集体经济组织成员权益纠纷案) [Peng Lili v. Peng’s Villager Grp., Tongjiaowan Village, Chengguan Town, 
Yongxing Cty. on Infringing Rights and Interests of Members of Econ. Collective] (Yongxing Cty. People’s 
Ct. Jan. 12, 2010) (China). 
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financially dependent on their land rights in the village,183 which is borne out  
in the data. 
Courts sometimes consider making contributions to the village as a sign 
of close connectedness with the village.184 MOW would sometimes volunteer 
to patrol the village and to help repair ancestral worship sites. 
MOW’s actual residences in their natal villages is sometimes used by the 
court to establish connectedness to the village. In some provinces, actual 
residency is even considered a prerequisite to obtaining membership status.185 
If the MOW are already enjoying land rights in their husbands’ village 
collective, the court has a tendency to invalidate the MOW’s membership in 
their natal village to avoid double-vesting of land entitlement. This view is 
borne out in the data.186 
 
TABLE 10: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY HER CONNECTION(S) WITH THE 
VILLAGE 
 
Connections Frequency Complete win Partial win Loss 

















































































185. See He, supra note 23, at 210 (explaining that actual residence was a “precondition to enjoying the 
dividends and other benefits”). 
186. See infra Table 10. 
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Primary source of Yes 96.15% 88.33% 11.33% 0.33% 
income (n=312)      
 No 3.85% 0.00% 25.00% 75.00% 
Contracted land 
(n=316) * 
Yes 91.14% 83.33% 13.89% 2.78% 
 No 8.86% 50.00% 28.57% 21.43% 
Obligations or Yes 76.19% 75.00% 25.00% 0.00% 
contributions      
(n=42) No 23.81% 20.00% 10.00% 70.00% 
Share certificates Yes 96.67% 65.52% 32.76% 1.72% 
and others (n=60)      
 No 3.33% 50.00% 50.00% 0.00% 
Enjoy land rights Yes 1.06% 33.33% 0.00% 66.67% 
in husband’s      
village Not 98.95% 81.63% 12.72% 5.65% 
(n=286)      
*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=27.186, P=0.000 (<0.01). 
 
F. LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE PARTIES 
 
1. Legal Representation of the Plaintiff 
Seven hundred eighty cases contained valid information on whether the 
plaintiff had legal representation. 187 The data shows that MOW litigants’ 
success rates varied significantly by legal representation of the plaintiff (chi- 
square=5.658, p=0.059). Interestingly, MOW litigants without legal 















187. See infra Table 11a. 
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TABLE 11A: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF EACH 
PARTY 
 



























30.49% 65.95% 21.98% 12.07% 33.206*** 
P=0.000 
No 69.51% 83.36% 13.04% 3.59% 
*NOTE: *P<0.1, **P<0.05, ***P<0.01 
 
2. Legal Representation of the Defendant 
Seven hundred sixty-one cases contained valid information on whether 
the defendant, village collective (VC), had legal representation.188 
The data show that MOW litigants had a higher rate of success when the 
defendant had no legal representation, meaning a represented defendant has a 
higher success rate. The data shows that MOW litigants’ success rate varied 
significantly by the legal representation of the defendant (chi-square=33.206, 
p=0.000). 
3.  Legal Representation of Both Parties (in Four Different 
Configurations) 
The data shows (n=719) that 4.31% were cases where the defendant had 
legal representation, but the plaintiff had no legal representation.189 The MOW 
litigants’ success rates were: 74.19% (complete win); 22.58% (partial win); 
and 3.23% (loss). In 16.41% of the cases, neither party had legal 
representation. The MOW litigant success rates were: 83.05% (complete win); 
14.41% (partial win); and 2.54% (loss). 
In 52.71% of the cases, the plaintiff had legal representation, but the 
defendant had no legal representation. The MOW litigants’ success rates were: 
82.85% (complete win); 12.93% (partial win); and 4.22% (loss). In 26.56% of 
the cases, both parties had legal representation. The MOW litigants’ success 
rates were: 65.45% (complete win); 20.42% (partial win); and 14.14% (loss). 
The data shows that, when the plaintiff had legal representation, whether or not 
the defendant had legal representation was significant for the MOW litigants’ 




188. See infra Table 11a. 
189. See infra Table 11b. 
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TABLE 11B: LEGAL REPRESENTATION (LR): LR OF PLAINTIFF (MOW) VS. LR 









No Defendant’s LR Yes 4.31% 74.19% 22.58% 3.23% 
No 16.41% 83.05% 14.41% 2.54% 
Total 20.72% 81.21% 16.11% 2.68% 
Yes* Defendant’s LR Yes 26.56% 65.45% 20.42% 14.14% 
 
No 52.71% 82.85% 12.93% 4.22% 
 
Total 79.28% 77.02% 15.44% 7.54% 
 
*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=26.158, P=0.000 (TWO-SIDED). 
 
4. Type of Legal Representation 
When the plaintiff was represented by a professional attorney from a law 
firm, 190 the MOW litigants’ success rate—combining complete and partial 
winning rates—varied with the different types of representation for the 
defendant: 95.86% (defendant has no legal representation); 85.72% (defendant 
represented by a professional attorney); and 100% (defendant represented by 
basic-level legal service). 
The data reveals that when the plaintiff retained basic-level legal 
service,191 the MOW litigants’ success rate—combining complete and partial 
winning rates—varies with the different types of representation for the 
defendant: 95.06% (defendant has no legal representation); 71.11% (defendant 
represented by professional attorney); 100% (defendant represented by basic- 
level legal service). 
The two sets of data above show, collectively, that whenever the 










190. See infra Table 11a. 
191. See infra Table 11a. 
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TABLE 11C: LEGAL REPRESENTATION (LR): LR OF PLAINTIFF VS. LR OF 
DEFENDANT (VC) BY THE TYPE OF THE LEGAL REPRESENTATION (N=719) 















 Defendant representative     
  
Professional 3.34% 75.00% 20.83% 4.17% 
  attorney     
  
Basic-level 0.97% 71.43% 28.57% 0.00% 




20.72% 81.21% 16.11% 2.68% 
Staff from LR of Professional 0.42% 100.00% – b – b 
legal Defendant attorney   
organization 
a 
    














40.33% 83.79% 12.07% 4.14% 
 
 




4.31% 77.42% 22.58% 0.00% 





LR of No legal 
representative 
1.25% 100.00% – b – b 







11.27% 76.54% 18.52% 4.94% 
  
Professional 6.26% 53.33% 17.78% 28.89% 
  attorney     
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Basic-level 
legal service 
1.67% 83.33% 16.67% 0.00% 








0.14% 100.00% – b – b 
Total 0.14% 100.00% – b – b 
 
*NOTE: ASTATISTICS WERE NOT COMPUTED BECAUSE LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE VILLAGE 
AND THE OUTCOMES OF CASES ARE CONSTANTS. BCANNOT BE OBTAINED DUE TO INSUFFICIENT 
NUMBER OF CASES IN THE CELL. 
5.  Legal Representation of the Parties, MOW’s Connection with the 
Village, and MOW Litigants’ Success Rates: A Three-Way Crosstabs 
Analysis 
In the bivariate analysis above, 192 which shows that MOW litigants’ 
success rates varied significantly by legal representation of the plaintiff (chi- 
square=5.658, p=0.059), it was found that MOW litigants without legal 
representation had a higher rates of success.193 However, the bivariate analysis 
may not give a complete picture since some of the explanatory variables are 
correlated. For example, is it possible that the plaintiffs who won without legal 
representation had stronger connection with the village? In order to test this, it 
is necessary to include a “connection with village” variable (connection 
variable) to control and perform a three-way crosstabs analysis.194 
From this analysis, when MOW’s household registrations were in the 
villages, legal representation of the MOW is significant in the variation of the 
outcome (chi-square=5.349, P=0.069). 195 When MOW’s household 
registrations were in the village, MOW without legal representation have a 
lower losing rate (3.45%) than those with legal representation (6.56%). 
When MOW were covered by the villages’ social or medical insurance, 
legal representation of the MOW is significant in the variation of MOW 
litigants’ success rates (chi-square=5.149, P=0.076). 196 When MOW were 
 
192. See supra Table 11a. 
193. The losing rate of the plaintiff was higher when she had legal representation (7.10%). The losing rate 
of the plaintiff was 2.87%when she had no legal representation. 
194. A three-way cross-tabulation analysis compares the results of three variables and presents their 
interrelations. See STUART MACDONALD & NICOLA HEADLAM, RESEARCH METHODS HANDBOOK: 
INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO RESEARCH METHODS FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH 28 (2008). In the MOW context, while 
the bivariate analysis shows that MOW litigants without legal representation have a higher success rate, it may 
not give a complete picture since some of the explanatory variables are correlated. It is possible that the 
winning cases without legal representation have a stronger (or closer) connection with the village. By 
introducing a third variable (the connection variable) as control (such as by performing the three-way cross- 
tabulation analysis), a more complete picture can be presented. 
195. See infra Table 12a. 
196. See infra Table 12e. 
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covered by the villages’ social or medical insurance, MOW without legal 
representation have a higher losing rate (11.11%) than those with legal 
representation (6.01%). For all other connection variables, legal representation 
of MOW is insignificant in the variation of the outcome.197 
The above three-way cross-tabs analysis offers a more complicated 
exposition of the role of the plaintiff’s lawyers. 198 In most situations 
(connection variables as the control), the three-way cross-tab analysis confirms 
the trend identified in the bivariate analysis in Table 11a: the MOW litigant 
without legal representation has a higher rate of success.199 
 
TABLE 12A: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF MOW 
(PLAINTIFF), MOW’S HOUSEHOLD REGISTRATION (IN OR OUTSIDE OF THE 









Yes* LR of MOW No 20.63% 80.69% 15.86% 3.45% 
Yes 78.09% 77.78% 15.66% 6.56% 
Total 98.72% 78.39% 15.71% 5.91% 
No LR of MOW Yes 1.28% 22.22% 11.11% 66.67% 
Total 1.28% 22.22% 11.11% 66.67% 

















197. Note that in some of the tables’ rows in this three-way cross-tabs analysis, the chi-square test is not 
applicable due to an insufficient number of cases in each cell. 
198. See infra Tables 12a–12j. 
199. With the exception of two situations—see infra Tables 12e and 12g—the three-way cross-tabs 
analysis presents a similar trend as identified in the bivariate analysis in Table 11a. 
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TABLE 12B: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF MOW 
(PLAINTIFF), MOW’S PLACE OF BIRTH (IN OR OUTSIDE OF THE VILLAGE), AND 
MOW’S SUCCESS RATES (N=526) 
 
Born in the 
village 





Yes* LR of No 19.58% 75.73% 20.39% 3.88% 
MOW Yes 78.71% 79.23% 15.94% 4.83% 
Total  98.29% 78.53% 16.83% 4.64% 
No LR of No 0.57% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
MOW Yes 1.14% 83.33% 0.00% 16.67% 
Total  1.71% 88.89% 0.00% 11.11% 




TABLE 12C: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF MOW 
(PLAINTIFF), MOW’S ACTUAL RESIDENCE (IN OR OUTSIDE OF THE VILLAGE), 









Yes LR of MOW No 16.10% 81.58% 18.42% 0.00% 
 Yes 58.05% 82.48% 16.06% 1.46% 
Total 74.15% 82.29% 16.57% 1.14% 
No LR of MOW No 2.97% 28.57% 28.57% 42.86% 
 Yes 22.88% 38.89% 18.52% 42.59% 
Total 25.85% 37.70% 19.67% 42.62% 
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TABLE 12D: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF MOW 









Yes LR of MOW No 15.46% 93.33% 6.67% 0.00% 
 Yes 82.47% 85.00% 12.50% 2.50% 
Total 97.94% 86.32% 11.58% 2.11% 
No LR of MOW Yes 2.06% 2.06% 0.00% 0.00% 
Total 2.00% 100% 0.00% 0.00% 
 
 
TABLE 12E: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF MOW 
(PLAINTIFF), MOW’S SOCIAL AND MEDICAL INSURANCE COVERAGE, AND 









Yes LR of MOW No 15.45% 66.67% 22.22% 11.11% 
 Yes 78.54% 83.06% 10.93% 6.01% 
Total 93.99% 80.37% 12.79% 6.85% 
No LR of MOW Yes 6.01% 28.57% 7.14% 64.29% 
 
 
Total 6.01% 28.57% 7.14% 64.29% 
*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=5.149, P=0.076 (<0.1). 
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TABLE 12F: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF MOW 











Yes LR of MOW No 17.01% 88.00% 12.00% 0.00% 
 Yes 78.91% 88.36% 11.21% 0.43% 
Total 95.92% 88.30% 11.35% 0.35% 
No LR of MOW No 1.36% 0.00% 75.00% 25.00% 
 Yes 2.72% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 




TABLE 12G: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF MOW 
(PLAINTIFF), MOW CONTRACTING LAND IN THE VILLAGE, AND MOW’S 
























Total 91.29% 83.97% 12.98% 3.05% 















Total 8.71% 52.00% 28.00% 20.00% 
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TABLE 12H: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF MOW 
(PLAINTIFF), MOW MAKING CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE VILLAGE, AND MOW’S 
























Total 78.05% 75.00% 25.00% 0.00% 















Total 21.95% 22.22% 11.11% 66.67% 
 
 
TABLE 12I: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF MOW 
(PLAINTIFF), MOW POSSESSING A SHARE CERTIFICATE OF THE VILLAGE 
























Total 96.00% 62.50% 35.42% 2.08% 















Total 4.00% 50.00% 50.00% 0.00% 
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TABLE 12J: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF MOW 
(PLAINTIFF), MOW’S ENJOYMENT OF LAND RIGHTS AS MEMBER OF 











Yes 81.37% 82.24% 11.21% 6.54% 
Total 98.86% 82.31% 11.92% 5.77% 
 
In the bivariate analysis above, 200 which shows that MOW litigants’ 
success rate varied significantly by legal representation of the defendant (chi- 
square=33.206, p=0.000), it was found that the defendant with legal 
representation had a higher rate of success. 201 As mentioned above, the 
bivariate analysis may not give a complete picture since some of the 
explanatory variables are correlated (a connection variable). It is therefore 
necessary to perform a three-way cross-tabs analysis with a connection 
variable as control. 
This analysis demonstrates that when MOW’s household registrations 
were in the village, legal representation of the defendant was significant in the 
variation of the outcome (chi-square=27.698, P=0.000). 202 When MOW’s 
household registrations were in the village and the defendant had legal 
representation, MOW litigants’ losing rate was 10.96%, as compared to 3.55% 
when the defendant had no legal representation. 
When MOW were born in the natal village, legal representation of the 
defendant is significant in the variation of MOW litigants’ success rates (chi- 
square=15.274, P=0.000).203 When MOW were born in the village and the 
defendant had legal representation, the MOW litigants’ losing rate was 7.78%, 
 
 
200. See supra Table 11a. 
201. The losing rate of the MOW litigants was much higher (12.07%) when the defendant had legal 
representation. The losing rate of the MOW litigant was 3.59% when the defendant had no legal 
representation. 
202. See infra Table 13a. 













0.38% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
 
Yes 0.76% 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 
Total 1.14% 33.33% 0.00% 66.67% 
No LR of 
No 
17.49% 82.61% 15.22% 2.17% 
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as compared to a losing rate of 2.79% when the defendant had no legal 
representation. 
When MOW did not enjoy land rights in their husbands’ village, legal 
representation of the defendant is significant in the variation of the outcome 
(chi-square=18.113, P=0.000).204 When MOW did not enjoy land rights in  
their husbands’ village and the defendant had legal representation, MOW 
litigants’ losing rate was 12.47%, as compared to a losing rate of 1.78% when 
the defendant had no legal representation. 
For all other connection variables, legal representation of the defendant is 
insignificant in the variation of the MOW litigants’ success rate.205 
The above three-way cross-tabs analysis confirms the trend identified in 
the bivariate analysis in Table 11a: the defendant with legal representation had 
a higher rate of success. 206 
 
TABLE 13A: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE 
VILLAGE COLLECTIVE (VC) (DEFENDANT), MOW’S HOUSEHOLD 






















Total  98.82% 78.96% 15.07% 5.97% 












Total  1.18% 25.00% 0.00% 75.00% 












204. See infra Table 13j. 
205. Note that, in some rows of the tables in this three-way cross-tabs analysis, the chi-square test is not 
applicable due to insufficient number of cases in each cell. 
206. See infra Tables 13a–13b, and 13j. 
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TABLE 13B: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE 
VILLAGE COLLECTIVE (VC) (DEFENDANT), MOW’S PLACE OF BIRTH (IN OR 
OUTSIDE OF THE VILLAGE), AND MOW’S SUCCESS RATES (N=512) 
 
Born in the 
village 





Yes LR of the Yes 35.16% 70.00% 22.22% 7.78% 
 VC No 63.09% 84.21% 13.00% 2.79% 
 Total 98.24% 79.13% 16.30% 4.57% 
No LR of the Yes 0.39% 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 
 VC No 1.37% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 Total  1.76% 88.89% 0.00% 11.11% 




TABLE 13C: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE 
VILLAGE COLLECTIVE (VC) (DEFENDANT), MOW’S PLACE OF BIRTH (IN OR 









Yes LR of the Yes 16.31% 68.42% 31.58% 0.00% 
 VC No 59.23% 88.41% 10.14% 1.45% 
 Total 75.54% 84.09% 14.77% 1.14% 
No* LR of the Yes 15.45% 33.33% 16.67% 50.00% 
 VC No 9.01% 42.86% 23.81% 33.33% 
 Total 24.46% 36.84% 19.30% 43.86% 
*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=1.517, P=0.468. 
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TABLE 13D: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE 
VILLAGE COLLECTIVE (VC) (DEFENDANT), MOW GROWING UP IN THE 
VILLAGE, AND MOW’S SUCCESS RATES (N=100) 
Growing up 







Yes LR of Yes 39.00% 82.05% 12.82% 5.13% 
the VC No 59.00% 91.53% 8.47% 0.00% 
 Total 98.00% 87.76% 10.20% 2.04% 

















TABLE 13E: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE 
VILLAGE COLLECTIVE (VC) (DEFENDANT), MOW’S SOCIAL AND MEDICAL 
























Total 94.04% 80.09% 13.57% 6.33% 














Total 5.96% 28.57% 7.14% 64.29% 
*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=2.259, P=0.323. 
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TABLE 13F: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE 
VILLAGE COLLECTIVE (VC) (DEFENDANT), MOW’S PRIMARY SOURCE OF 

























Total 96.27% 89.08% 10.56% 0.35% 















Total 3.73% 0.00% 27.27% 72.73% 
 
 
TABLE 13G: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE 
VILLAGE COLLECTIVE (VC) (DEFENDANT), MOW CONTRACTING LAND IN THE 
























 Total 91.67% 84.47% 12.88% 2.65% 















 Total 8.33% 50.00% 29.17% 20.83% 
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TABLE 13H: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE 
VILLAGE COLLECTIVE (VC) (DEFENDANT), MOW MAKING CONTRIBUTIONS 
























Total 81.58% 77.42% 22.58% 0.00% 















Total 18.42% 14.29% 14.29% 71.43% 
 
 
TABLE 13I: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE 
VILLAGE COLLECTIVE (VC) (DEFENDANT), MOW POSSESSING A SHARE 


























Total 98.00% 73.47% 24.49% 2.04% 
No LR of the Yes 
VC 
2.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
Total 2.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
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TABLE 13J: THREE-WAY CROSSTAB OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE 
VILLAGE COLLECTIVE (VC) (DEFENDANT), MOW’S ENJOYMENT OF LAND 
RIGHTS AS MEMBER OF HUSBAND’S VILLAGE, AND MOW’S SUCCESS RATES 
(N=269) 
 






Yes LR of No 
the VC 
1.12% 33.33% 0.00% 66.67% 
Total 1.12% 33.33% 0.00% 66.67% 












Total 98.88% 81.95% 12.41% 5.64% 




G. LAW AND REGULATIONS OF THE STATE 
 
1. National Statutes Applied in the Case 
Among the various national statutes applied, the data shows (n=858) that 
only the General Principles of Civil Law (GPCL) 207 (chi-square=27.742, 
P=0.000) had significance in the variation of the outcome.208 MOW’s success 
rates are higher when GPCL is applied. The same is true for the Law on the 
Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests. 
The data also shows the variations of the outcome by applying other 
relevant national statutes: Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees, Property 
Law, Rural Land Contract Law, Land Management Law, and Law on 




207. Minfa Tongze ( 民 法 通 则 ) [General Principles of Civil Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/06/content_4470.htm 
(China). 
208. See infra Table 14a. 
209. Renkou yu Jihua Shengyu Fa (人口与计划生育法) [Population and Family Planning Law of the 
People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2001, 
effective Sept. 1, 2002), http://www.gov.cn/english/laws/2005-10/11/content_75954.ht (China). 
210. Qinquan Zeren Fa (侵权责任法) [Tort Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010), http://english.www.gov.cn/ 
archive/laws_regulations/2014/08/23/content_281474983043584.htm (China). 
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TABLE 14A: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY NATIONAL STATUTES (N=858) 
 

















































2. National Judicial and Administrative Rules Applied in the Case 
Among the various national level judicial and administrative rules 
applied—including  the  Implementation Rules for  Land  Management Law,211 
 
 
211. Tudi Guanli Shishi Tiaoli (土地管理实施条例) [Land Administration Law of the People's Republic 
of     China]    (promulgated     by    the    St.     Council,    Dec.     27,     1998,     effective    Jan.    1,     1999); 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2016/content_5139471.htm. 
of Women’s Rights No 57.81% 71.17% 18.15% 10.69% 










Rural Land Contract Yes 6.53% 85.71% 12.50% 1.79% 
 
Law No 93.47% 75.81% 17.71% 6.48%  
Land Management Yes 6.06% 69.23% 25.00% 5.77% 
 
Law No 93.94% 76.92% 16.87% 6.20% 
Marriage Law Yes 2.10% 88.89% 5.56% 5.56% 
 No 97.90% 76.19% 17.62% 6.19% 
Law on Population Yes 1.28% 72.73% 27.27% 0.00% 
and Family Planning No 98.72% 76.51% 17.24% 6.26% 
Tort Liability Law Yes 0.93% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 No 99.07% 76.24% 17.53% 6.24% 
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SPC’s Reply on Disputes of Allocating Rural Collective Economic Benefits,212 
and Central Government’s  Rule  on  Protecting  Rural  Women’s  Land  
Rights 213 —the data shows (n=858) that only section 24 of the SPC’s 
Explanation on Rural Land Contract Disputes (RLCD) (chi-square=14.692, 
P=0.001) had significance in the variations in the outcome.214 The data shows 
that the losing rate is higher (2.42% difference) when RLCD is not applied in 
the case. 
 
TABLE 14B: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY NATIONAL JUDICIAL AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES (N=858) 
 





SPC’s Explanation on Yes 73.66% 79.75% 14.72% 5.54% 










Implementation Rules for Yes 














SPC’s Reply on Disputes of Yes 
Allocating Rural Collective 













Central Government’s Yes 0.35% 66.67% 33.33% 0.00% 
Rule on Protecting Rural 

















212. Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Dui Nongcun Jiti Jingji Suode Shouyi Fenpei Jiufen Shifou Shouli Wenti de 
Dafu (关于人民法院对农村集体经济所得收益分配纠纷是否受理问题的答复) [Reply of the Supreme 
People’s Court on Disputes of Allocating Rural Collective Econ. Benefits] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., 
July 9, 2001), http://pkulaw.cn/(S(21ctss45i13hjxjvmt44tijw))/fulltext_form.aspx? 
Db=alftwotitle&Gid=61542d7bfe1bf1b3bdfb (China). 
213. Zhonggong Zhongyang Bangongting, Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Qieshi Weihu Nongcun 
Funü Tudi Chengbao Quanyi de Tongzhi (中共中央办公厅、国务院办公厅关于切实维护农村妇女土地承
包权益 的通知) [Notice of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the 
State Council on Protecting Rural Women’s Land Rights] (promulgated by the Gen. Office, CPC Cen. Comm. 
and the Gen. Office of the St. Council, May. 8, 2001, effective May. 8, 2001), 
http://fgcx.bjcourt.gov.cn:4601/law?fn=chl508s518.txt (China). 
214. See infra Table 14b. 
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3.  Provincial Statutes, Administrative Rules, and Judicial Rules 
Applied in the Case 
The data shows that when courts applied provincial statutes that protected 
women’s rights (n=858),215 the MOW litigants’ success rate was 100%.216 
The data also shows the MOW litigants’ success rates when the following 
were applied: 217 (1) provincial statutes/administrative rules that regulate 
population and family planning, the rural collective economy, and land 






















215. See supra Table 14b; see also, e.g., Fujiansheng Shishi Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Funü Quanyi 
Baozhang Fa Banfa (福建省 实施《中华人民共和国妇女权益保障法》办法) [Implementation Measures of 
Fujian Province on Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. People’s Cong. Fujian Province, Nov. 12, 1993, rev’d Sept. 28, 2008, effective Dec. 1, 2008), 
http://www.fujian.gov.cn/zc/flfg/dfxfg/200902/t20090224_1200100.htm (China); Guangdongsheng Shishi 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Funü Quanyi Baozhang Fa Banfa (广东省实施《中华人民共和国妇女 权益
保障法》办法) [Implementation Measures of Guangdong Province on Law on the Protection of Women’s 
Rights and Interests] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. People’s Cong. Guangdong Province, May. 31, 
2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007), CLI.10.173469 (China). 
216. See infra Table 14c. 
217. See infra Table 14c. 
218. See, e.g., Guangdongsheng Nongcun Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Guanli Guiding (广东省农村集体经济组织管
理 规定) [Provisions of Guangdong Province for the Administration on Rural Econ. Collective] (promulgated 
by the Guangdong Province Government, Aug. 9, 2006, effective Oct. 1, 2006), 
http://www.gdagri.gov.cn/ywzx/ncjjzzglc/201507/t20150723486299.html (China). 
219. See, e.g., Guanyu Shenli Nongcun Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Tudi Buchangfei Fenpei Jiufen Anjian Ruogan 
Wenti de Yijian (关于审理农村集体经济组织土地补偿费分配纠纷案件若干问题的意见) [Opinions on 
Adjudicating Cases of Disputes on Allocation of Land Indemnity of Rural Econ. Collective (For Trial 
Implementation)] (promulgated by the High Ct. Hainan Province, June 8, 2012, effective June 8, 2012) 
(Westlaw China). 
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TABLE 14C: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY PROVINCIAL STATUTES, 
ADMINISTRATIVE/ JUDICIAL RULES (N=858) 
 





Provincial statutes Yes 6.53% 92.86% 7.14% 0.00% 
protecting     











on population and directly    
family planning relevant    











administrative directly    
provisions on relevant    
rural collective 
economy 











on land contract directly    
 relevant    
 No 99.65% 76.37% 17.43% 6.20% 
Provincial judicial Yes 1.06% 88.89% 11.11% 0.00% 
rules (pro-MOW)     
 No 98.95% 76.33% 17.43% 6.24% 
Human rights Yes 1.05% 77.78% 22.22% 0.00% 
 
No 98.95% 76.44% 17.31% 6.24% 
 
4. Court’s Reference to “Human Rights” in Its Judgment 
An interesting observation can be drawn from the nine cases (frequency 
rate of 1.05%)220 that mentioned “human rights.”221 All cases were from the 
 
220. See supra Table 14c. 
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Hunan Province, handed down by four different judges from three courts, and 
decided in 2017.222 It appears that whether the court uses the term “human 
rights” is very judge-specific. The location and the judicial atmosphere of the 
court may also play a role. 
 
5. Court Applying Substantive Law, Procedural Law, or Both 
The data shows (n=858) the outcome varied significantly by the court 
applying substantive law, procedural law, 223 or both (chi-square=18.554, 
P=0.001).224 
 
TABLE 15: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY APPLICATION OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW, 
PROCEDURAL LAW, OR BOTH (N=858) 
 














































law      





221. The courts are not allowed to directly apply the PRC Constitution. The phrase “human rights” is 
highly sensitive and seldom referred to in court decisions. 
222. See, e.g., Yuan Xingu, Yuan Ruijie Yu Zhuzhou Shi Lusong Qu Baiguan Zhen Chengjiaba Cun 
Hehua Zu Qinhai Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Chengyuan Quanyi Jiufen Yishen Minshi Panjueshu, at 1 (袁新谷、袁睿婕
与株洲市芦 淞区白关镇城家坝村荷花组侵害集体经济组织成员权益纠纷一审民事判决书 ) [Civil 
Judgement for Court of First Instance of Yuan Xingu & Yuan Ruijie v. Hehua Grp., Chengjiaba Village, 
Baiguan Town, Lusong District, Zhuzhou City on Infringing Rights and Interests of Members of Econ. 
Collective] (Zhuzhou Lusong Dist. People’s Ct. Apr. 17, 2017) (China); Zhang Qingrong Yu Zhuzhou Shi 
Lusong Qu Baiguan Zhen Chengjiaba Cun Hehua Zu Qinhai Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Chengyuan Quanyi Jiufen 
Yishen Minshi Panjueshu, at 1 (张清荣与株洲市芦淞区白关镇城家坝村荷花组侵害集体经济组织成员权
益纠纷一审民事判决书) [Civil Judgement for Court of First Instance of Zhang Qingrong v. Hehua Grp., 
Chengjiaba Village, Baiguan Town, Lusong District, Zhuzhou City on Infringing Rights and Interests of 
Members of Econ. Collective] (Zhuzhou Lusong Dist. People’s Ct. May 1, 2017) (China). 
223. Minshi Susong Fa (民事诉讼法) [Civil Procedure Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Apr. 9, 1991, effective Apr. 9, 1991) (China). 
224. See supra Table 15. 
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H. VILLAGE INTERNAL RULES 
The data shows (see Table 16a) that the outcome varied significantly by 
the appearance of “villagers’ charter” in the judgment (chi-square=12.472, 
P=0.002) in the court decision.225 Whenever “villagers’ charter” appeared in 
the court decision, MOW litigants had a lower losing rate—2%—as compared 
to a losing rate of 6.66% when “villagers’ charter” did not appear. The lower 
losing rate shows that the court probably conducted a substantive review of the 
villagers’ charter,226 and it ruled in favor of the MOW after concluding that the 
charter discriminated against the MOW.227 
The data shows (n=20)228 that MOW had the highest losing rate when the 
court confirmed the villagers’ charter regarding the determination of 
membership status (100%), and the lowest losing rate when the court either 
rejected the villagers’ charter (regarding determination of membership status) 
or refused to decide on the issue (both at 0%). The losing rate was at 40% 
when the court remained silent on the issue.229 
The data shows (n=97)230 that MOW had the lowest losing rate when the 
court rejected the villagers’ charter regarding the allocation arrangement (0%), 
and the highest losing rate when the court deferred the issue to the village 
(42.86%). The losing rate was at 33.33% when the court confirmed the 












225. See infra Table 16a. 
226. The phrase “villagers’ charter” would only appear in the court decision if the villagers’ charter denied 
MOW’s right to compensation. 
227. In other words, the court in this situation did not simply adopt the villagers’ charter in the name of 
village autonomy. It shows that, while the political process in China delegated power to the village 
organization to decide matters within the village’s de facto autonomy, judicial power sometimes penetrated 
this autonomy and reversed some local norms and regulations. For a case example, see He X Su Chenzhou Shi 
Suxian Qu Bailutang Zhen Yashi Cun Disi Cunmin Xiaozu Qinhai Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Chengyuan Quanyi Jiufen 
An, at 1 (何 X 诉郴州市苏仙区白露塘镇雅市村第四村民小组侵害集体经济组织成员权益纠纷案) [He X 
v. No. 4 Villager Grp., Yashi Village, Bailutang Town, Suxian Dist., Chenzhou City on Infringing Rights and 
Interests of Members of Econ. Collective] (Suzhou Dist. People’s Ct. Feb. 13, 2012) (China). 
228. See infra Table 16a. The “treatment” of MOW’s membership status by the villagers’ charter must be 
negative (for example, perhaps rejection), otherwise the issue would not have gone to court. 
229. See supra Table 16a. 
230. See supra Table 16a. The “treatment” of MOW’s membership status by the villagers’ charter must be 
negative (for example, perhaps rejection), otherwise the issue would not have gone to court. 
231. See supra Table 16a. 
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TABLE 16A: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY VARIABLES RELATING TO 
VILLAGERS’ CHARTER 
 







11.75% 69% 29% 2.00% 
in Court No  88.25% 77.50% 15.85% 6.66% 
decision*       
(n=851)       
Court Confirm  10% 0.00% 0.00% 100% 
decision on charter      
charter       
(membership Reject  50% 50% 50.00% 0.00% 
status) (n=20) charter      
 Silent  25% 60% 0.00% 40% 
 Decline to 15% 0.00% 100% 0.00% 
 make      
 decision      
Court Confirm  3.09% 33.33% 33.33% 33.33% 
Decision on 
charter 
charter      
(allocation Reject 89.69% 72.41% 27.59% 0.00% 
arrangement) charter     
(n=97)      
 Defer to VC 7.22% 28.57% 28.57% 42.86% 
*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=12.472, P=0.002 (2-SIDED). 
Interestingly, whenever “allocation agreement” appeared in the court 
decision,232 MOW litigants had a higher losing rate (8.11%), as compared to a 
losing rate of 2.98% when “allocation agreement” did not appear. This is 
inconsistent with the above finding on the appearance of “villagers’ charters” 
in court decisions, an inconsistency that cannot be explained. 233 The data 
shows that the outcome varied significantly by the appearance of “allocation 
agreement” (chi-square=10.457, P=0.005) in the court decision. 
The data shows (n=33)234 that MOW had the highest losing rate when the 
court confirmed the allocation agreement regarding the determination of 
 
232. See infra Table 16b. 
233. Nonetheless, this may be attributed to the fact that the allocation agreement—a more technical 
document—is more subtle than the villagers’ charter when it comes to denying MOW’s rights. The court, even 
having conducted a substantive review of the allocation agreement, is less likely to be able to pinpoint any 
specific discriminatory provisions in the allocation agreement (unlike the villagers’ charter) to help MOW. 
234. See infra Table 16b. The “treatment” of MOW’s membership status by the allocation agreement must 
be negative (for example, perhaps rejection), otherwise the issue would not have gone to court. 
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membership status (100%), and the lowest losing rate when the court rejected 
the allocation agreement regarding membership status (0%). The losing rate 
was at 75% percent when the court deferred the issue to the village.235 
The data shows (n=372)236 that MOW had the lowest losing rate when the 
court altered or rejected the allocation agreement on compensation allocation 
(both at 0%), and the highest losing rate when the court remained silent on this 
issue (both at 100%). The losing rate was 58.33% when the court confirmed 
the allocation agreement, and then 87.50% when the court deferred the issue to 
the village.237 
 






Appearance in the 
court decision* 
(n=854) 
Yes 60.66% 73.75% 18.15% 8.11% 
No 39.34% 80.65% 16.37% 2.98% 
Procedural  defects in Yes 2.02% 80% 20% 0.00% 




















*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=10.457, P=0.005 (2-SIDED). 
 
 
235. See infra Table 16b. 
236. See infra Table 16b. The “treatment” of compensation allocation by the allocation agreement must be 
negative (for example, perhaps rejection), otherwise the issue would not have gone to court. 















(n=33) Reject 84.85% 75% 25.00% 0.00% 
 allocation    
 agreement    
 
Defer to VC 12.12% 25% 0.00% 75% 
Court decision on Confirm 6.45% 25% 16.67% 58.33% 
allocation agreement Alter 1.34% 20% 80% 0.00% 
(allocation 
Reject
 88.71% 83.33% 16.67% 0.00% 
(n=372) 
    
Silent 1.34% 0.00% 0.00% 100% 
Defer to VC 2.15% 0.00% 12.50% 87.5% 
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I. PREVIOUS DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
 
1. Previous Judicial Proceedings 
In some cases, the plaintiff (MOW) and/or the defendant (VC) in the 
current litigation had previously litigated on the allocation of compensation for 
MOW (Previous Judicial Proceedings).238 
From the data (n=802), 13.47% of the cases involved Previous Judicial 
Proceedings where the same MOW litigant sued the same defendant village 
organization and had her membership confirmed. Of these cases, 0.25% 
involved Previous Judicial Proceedings where the same MOW litigant sued the 
same defendant village organization and had her membership denied. Of these 
cases, 0.12% involved Previous Judicial Proceedings where the same MOW 
litigant sued the same defendant village organization, and the court refused to 
make a decision on the matter. 
 
 
TABLE 17: MOW’S SUCCESS RATE BY PREVIOUS DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
 
















 membership    
 
Yes, and denied 0.25% 
membership 
50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 
 
Yes, and rejected 1.25% 
previous 
Allocation Agt. (w/ 
another MOW) 
70.00% 0.00% 30.00% 
 
Yes, and refused to 0.12% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
decide on 
membership 









238. See infra Table 17. 
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No 90.15% 75.42% 18.21% 6.37% 
Yes, with a 0.35% 
settlement 
66.67% 33.33% 0.00% 
 Yes, without a 7.62% 87.69% 10.77% 1.54% 
 settlement    
 
The same VC vs. 1.88% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 another MOW    
Citizens’ No 97.89% 77.46% 16.43% 6.12% 
Petition     
(Xinfang) Yes, favored 0.82% 28.57% 71.43% 0.00% 
(n=852) MOW    
 Yes, against MOW 0.23% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 Yes, no outcome 1.06% 44.44% 44.44% 11.11% 




One percent of the cases involved Previous Judicial Proceedings where 
the same MOW litigant sued the same defendant village organization, but the 
outcome of the cases was not provided. 
It is interesting that defendants in 13.47% of the cases continued with a 
distribution policy knowing that it contradicted the decision of the court in the 
Previous Judicial Proceedings.239 This is contrasted with only 0.25% of the 
cases where the plaintiff sued again knowing that the court had already ruled 
against her in the Previous Judicial Proceedings. 
In 1.25% of the cases, there were Previous Judicial Proceedings where 




239. See Zhang Lihong Deng Su Changsha Shi Yuhua Qu Dongjing Zhen Tianhua Cun Cunmin 
Weiyuanhui Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Shouyi Fenpei Jiufen An (张利红等诉长沙市雨花区洞井镇天华村村民委员会
集体经济组织收益分配纠纷案) [Zhang Lihong et al. v. Villager Comm., Tianhua Village, Dongjing Town, 
Yuhua District, Changsha City on Dispute of Income Distribution of Members of Econ. Collective] (Changsha 
Yuhua Dist. People’s Ct. Apr. 28, 2009) (China). 








 Yes, against MOW 0.12% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
 Yes, no resolution 2.97% 68.00% 8.00% 24.00% 
 Yes, no outcome 0.12% 
recorded 
100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
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2. Previous Administrative Complaints 
In some cases,240 the plaintiff had lodged an administrative complaint 
with the relevant township government authority against the defendant prior to 
the commencement of the judicial proceedings (Previous Administrative 
Complaint).241 
From the data (n=843), 14.83% of the cases involved a Previous 
Administrative Complaint in which the relevant township government 
authority had ruled in favor of the MOW. The data shows that a favorable 
decision for the MOW in the Previous Administrative Complaint guarantees 
victory for the MOW in the ensuing judicial proceedings. 
In 0.12% of the cases there was a Previous Administrative Complaint in 
which the relevant authority had ruled against MOW. The data shows that an 
unfavorable decision for the MOW in the Previous Administrative Complaint 
guarantees defeat for the MOW in the ensuing judicial proceedings. 
In 2.97% of the cases there was a Previous Administrative Complaint 
with no outcome. In this situation, the MOW’s losing rate was 24%, 
substantially higher than the losing rate when there was no Previous 
Administrative Complaint at all (6.08%). A possible explanation is that the 
court views a non-decision by the administrative authority as an indication of 
the lack of merit in the MOW’s case, thereby placing MOW in a less 
advantageous position in the ensuing judicial proceedings. 
In 0.12% of the cases there was a Previous Administrative Complaint, but 
no further information was provided regarding the decision of the relevant 
authority. 
3. Previous Citizens’ Petition 
In some cases,242 the plaintiff had lodged a citizens’ petition (letters and 
visits, or xinfang) with the relevant authority against the defendant (VC) prior 
to the commencement of the judicial proceedings (Previous Citizens’ 
Petition).243 
From the data (n=852), 0.82% of the cases involved a Previous Citizens’ 
Petition in which the relevant authority had ruled in favor of the MOW. In 
0.23% of the cases, there was a Previous Citizens’ Petition in which the 
relevant authority had ruled against the MOW. In 1.06 % of the cases, there 





240. See supra Table 17. 
241. See He, supra note 23. 
242. See supra Table 17. 
243. For an explanation of the role of xinfang in China’s judicial politics, see NG & HE, supra note 29, at 
126–28. 
244. See supra Table 17. 
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J. PROCEDURAL VARIABLES 
In Table 18a, the data shows (n=858) that, in 36.83% of the cases, the 
defendant in single-defendant cases, or all defendants in multiple-defendant 
cases, was or were absent at trial (complete trial in absentia). In 60.49% of the 
cases, the defendant or all defendants was or were present at trial. It is quite 
clear from the data that a complete trial in absentia substantially lowers the 
losing rate of the MOW litigant. 
From the data, 2.68% were cases with multiple defendants where at least 
one co-defendant was present and at least one co-defendant was absent (partial 
trial in absentia). It appears that MOW litigants fared better in partial trial in 
absentia cases when compared to cases where the defendant (in single- 
defendant cases, or all defendants in multiple-defendant cases) was present at 
trial. However, the MOW is worse off in partial trial in absentia cases when 
compared to complete trial in absentia cases. 
 
TABLE 18A: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY ATTENDANCE OF THE DEFENDANT 
(N=858) 
Trial in Absentia* Frequency Complete win Partial Win Loss 
 
Yes 36.83% 85.44% 11.71% 2.85% 
Partially 2.68% 78.26% 17.39% 4.35% 
No 60.49% 70.91% 20.81% 8.29% 
*NOTE: CHI-SQUARE=24.334, P=0.000 (<0.01). 
 
Another procedural variable in Table 18b is the burden of proof in 
determining whether the village land or its derivative interests constitutes the 
primary source of income of MOW litigants which is, in itself, a connection 
variable. 245 From the data (n=189), 43.92% were cases where the court 
imposed the burden of proof on the plaintiff (MOW). In this situation, the 
complete winning rate of MOW litigants was 67.47%, the partial winning rate 
was 10.84% and the losing rate was 21.69%. This is contrasted with cases 
where the court imposed the burden of proof on the defendant (VC) (a rate of 
frequency of 56.08%), in which the complete winning rate of the MOW 






245. This variable relates to the burden of proof only. It does not reveal the actual number of cases in 
which the village land or its derivative interests constitutes the primary source of income of the MOW litigant. 
246. See infra Table 18b. For MOW litigants with existing land rights in the village, the court considers it 
a relevant factor if the MOW litigant relies on such rights as her primary source of income, and whether she 
exercises the such rights by way of engaging in agricultural activities or by receiving rental income (if the land 
is rented out). 
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TABLE 18B: MOW’S SUCCESS RATES BY BURDEN OF PROOF FOR PRIMARY 
SOURCE OF INCOME (N=189) 
 
Burden of Proof for 






The MOW 43.92% 67.47% 10.84% 21.69% 





A. THE HAVE-NOTS CAME OUT AHEAD 
As shown above in Table 4, the MOW litigant (the plaintiff/ the “have- 
not”) prevailed over the village collective (the defendant/ the “have”) with a 
“complete winning rate” of 76.50%. The MOW litigant only lost 6.20% of the 
time. 
The results of this study clearly contradict Galanter’s party capability 
theory. In He and Su’s Study, across all types of parties and disputes, the OS 
(as plaintiff) only completely won 19.49% of the time when matched against 
the RP (as defendant).247 If one focuses on the type of dispute and nature of the 
parties that bears the closest resemblance to MOW lawsuits—the farmer 
(“have-nots”) suing the government agency or government-related company 
(“haves”)—the data in He and Su’s Study shows that the farmer loses 100% of 
the time. The stark difference in outcome between this study and He and Su’s 
Study suggests that some factors other than party capability had reversed the 
power balance between the parties. 
 
B. WHY DID THE “HAVE-NOTS” PREVAIL?—THE COURTS FAVORED THE 
“HAVE-NOTS” 
This study shows the individual OS litigant from an underprivileged 
group (MOW) prevailed over the institutional government-backed RP (village 
collectives). This discovery is particularly significant because the Chinese 
judicial system, similar to its counterparts in other authoritarian states, is 
commonly seen as a system that favors the “haves” in a disproportionate 
manner due to the lack of judicial independence (which enhances the 
likelihood of courts being swayed by powerful external influence in favor of 
the stronger party).248 The data, however, shows the courts favored the “have- 
nots” over the “haves.” It is believed that the judicial favor for MOW has 
 
 
247. He and Su, supra note 2, at 130 tbl.1. 
248. He and Su, supra note 2, at 123; Xifen Lin & Wei Shen, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in 
China’s Prisons?—An Empirical Study of China’s Commutation Procedures, INT. J. L., CRIME & JUST., Mar. 
2017, at 1, 2 (2017). 
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neutralized the party-capability advantages enjoyed by the village collectives 
(the “haves”) and propelled the MOW (the “have-nots”) to victory.249 One 
informant confirmed that courts generally favored MOW—recognizing that 
they have basic rights in their natal village— 250 and legislations were 
interpreted in a way that helps MOW.251 The data supports the view that courts 
favored MOW. 
First, courts have consistently applied statutory provisions favorable to 
MOW (see Tables 14a and 14b), and avoided dealing with the legislative 
loopholes and inconsistencies that help the village collective.252 For example, 
the courts applied the Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests 
42.19% of the time,253 with provisions highly favorable to the MOW litigant 
(such as Articles 32 and 33).254 Similarly, courts have consistently applied the 
Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committees (such as Article 27).255 
Second, Article 24 of the SPC’s Explanation on Rural Land Contract 
Disputes can be interpreted both ways—either favorable or unfavorable to the 
MOW. Although Article 24 clearly stated that courts should uphold equal 
 
 
249. Another reason that explains the have-nots coming out ahead, albeit slightly remote, is the 
international scrutiny exercised by the CEDAW Committee on China. With its latest report to the CEDAW 
Committee due (China was due to submit its latest report to the CEDAW Committee by 1 November 2018), 
China desperately needs to show to the international community the progress that it has made on the MOW 
issue. There is some speculation that ongoing international pressure in the past years has translated into 
domestic policies that favored MOW litigants. One example of these policies is the latest notice issued by the 
SPC on the enforcement of law in rural China. The MOW issue was specifically mentioned (in art. 37): 
“[rural] married-out women must be protected according to the law and regulations”. See Guanyu Wei Shishi 
Xiangcun Zhenxing Zhanlüe Tigong Sifa Fuwu he Baozhang De Yijian (关于为实施乡村振兴战略提供司法
服务和保障的意见) [Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Providing Judicial Services and Safeguards 
for Implementation of Village Revitalization Strategy] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Oct. 23, 2018, 
effective Oct. 23, 2018) (China). 
250. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Male, Judge, Jiangxi Province Basic-Level Court (Apr. 2, 
2018) [hereinafter Interview with Anonymous Male Judge in Jiangxi Province]. This view is confirmed by a 
practicing lawyer who handled numerous MOW lawsuits. See Telephone Interview with Anonymous Male 
Lawyer, Beijing (Jan. 29, 2018) [hereinafter Interview with Anonymous Male Attorney]. 
251. Interview with Anonymous Female Judge in Shaanxi Province, supra note 156. 
252. See supra note 19 accompanying text. 
253. When Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests is applied the losing rate of the MOW 
litigant is lower (0%) than when it is not applied (10.69%). 
254. Courts in these cases emphasized that MOW should be treated equally, and marriage should not be an 
excuse to deprive her of her rights. See, e.g., Chen Li yu Wenchang Shi Wencheng Zhen Liaoyuan Cunmin 
Weiyuanhui Houlangchen Cunmin Xiaozu Qinhai Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Chengyuan Quanyi Jiufen (陈丽与文昌市
文城镇燎原村民委员会后崀陈村民小组侵害集体经济组织成员权益纠纷) [In re Dispute on Infringing 
Rights and Interests of Members of Econ. Collective between Chen Li & Houlangchen Village Comm., 
Wencheng Town, Wenchang City] (Wenchang City People’s Ct. Apr. 15, 2014) (China). 
255. Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees was applied 42.77% of the time. See supra Table 14a. In 
cases where the court applied the Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committees, the court emphasized the need of 
circumventing the authority of the villagers committee to ensure the legality of its action. See supra note 19. 
See, e.g., Zhang Moumou Deng Su Lanzhou Shi Xigu Qu Hekou Xiang Datan Cunmin Weiyuanhui Deng 
Qinhai Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Chengyuan Quanyi Jiufen (张某某等诉兰州市西固区河口乡大滩村民委员会等侵害
集体经济组织成员权益纠纷案) [Zhang Moumou v. Datan Village Comm., Hekou Township, Xigu Dist., 
Lanzhou City on Infringing Rights and Interests of Members of Econ. Collective] (Lanzhou Xigu Dist. 
People’s Ct. Aug. 4, 2015) (China). 
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rights of village collective members in the allocation of compensation, the test 
for “membership” is not provided. The court is at liberty to say Article 24 is 
inapplicable as the MOW has not been confirmed a member.256 Yet the data 
shows that whenever Article 24 was applied,257 the MOW litigant loses less 
often, at 5.54%, as compared to 7.96% when Article 24 is not applied (chi- 
square=14.692, p=0.001). Thus, when the court had discretion to interpret a 
rule one way or another, it chose to interpret it in a way that favors MOW. 
Third, the data also shows that most courts are not concerned with the 
policy of “village autonomy,” or rural self-governance, key principles 
underscoring the village collective’s case. The data in Table 7 shows that the 
overwhelming majority of courts did not mention “village autonomy” in their 
judgment (90.68%). This shows that the principle of village autonomy has 
become less important for courts in adjudicating MOW lawsuits.258 
Fourth, courts generally do not believe the village collective has the 
discretion to determine the membership issue when the lawsuit is already in 
progress.259 The data in Table 6 shows that the courts in 92.46% of the cases 
had directly confirmed the membership statuses of MOW without giving any 
discretion to the village collectives. In all these cases, MOW litigants had 
either completely won or partially won (no losses at all). 
Fifth, the data in Table 10 shows courts generally side with MOW 
whenever a connection is established between MOW and their natal villages 
(see Table 10). 260 With the exception of “growing up in the village” and 
 
256. See generally Liu Yu Yu Langxi Xian Jianping Zhen Wenchang Shequ Jumin Weiyuanhui Liuwan 
Cunminzu Qinhai Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Chengyuan Quanyi Jiufen Yishen Minshi Panjueshu (刘玉与郎溪县建平镇
文昌社区居民委员会刘湾村民组侵害集体经济组织成员权益纠纷一审民事判决书) [Civil Judgement of 
Liu Yu v. Liuwan Villager Grp., Wenchang Cmty. Residents Comm., Jianping Town, Langxi Cty. on 
Infringing Rights and Interests of Members of Econ. Collective] (Lanxi Cty. People’s Ct. Aug. 3, 2016) 
(China) (exemplifying a decision where the court exercised its discretion to interpret Article 24 of the SPC’s 
Explanation on Rural Land Contract Disputes in a way that was unfavorable to MOW). But see Peng Qiumi Su 
Xiamen   Shi  Xiang’an   Qu  Xindian   Zhen   Shamei  Shequ  Diwu  Jumin  Xiaozu   Qinfan Jiti Jingji  Zuzhi 
Chengyuan Quanyi Jiufen An (彭秋密诉厦门市翔安区新店镇沙美社区第五居民小组侵犯集体经济组织成
员权益纠纷案) [Peng Qiumi v. No. 5 Resident Grp., Shamei Cmty., Xindian Town, Xiang’an Dist., Xiamen 
City on Infringing Rights and Interests of Members of Econ. Collective] (Xiamen Xiang’an Dist. People’s Ct. 
Dec. 17, 2010) (China) (exemplifying a decision where the court exercised its discretion to interpret Article 24 
of the SPC’s Explanation on Rural Land Contract Disputes in a way that was favorable to the MOW). 
257. See, e.g., Yuangao Qing Lan, Guo Mou Su Beigao Kulun Zhen Shangyang Xumu Gacha Weiyuanhui 
Qinhai Jiti Jingji Zuzhi Chengyuan Quanyi Jiufen (原告青兰、郭某诉被告库伦镇上养畜牧嘎查委员会侵害
集体经济组织成员权益纠纷) [Qing Lan & Guo Mou v. Shangyang Xumu Gacha Comm., Kulun Town on 
Infringing Rights and Interests of Members of Econ. Collective] (Kulun Cty. People’s Ct. Nov. 27, 2014) 
(China). 
258. While one may argue that courts may have considered or applied the principle despite not having 
referred to it explicitly in the decision, the very low losing rate (4.88%) suggests that only a small fraction of 
cases would be in that category. Even when the court expressly referred to the principle (9.32% of the cases), 
the combined winning rate was still much higher than the losing rate. This shows that the principle is no longer 
an overriding consideration, albeit still a relevant consideration for some courts, in adjudicating these cases. 
259. See supra Table 5. In only 2.36% of cases, the court left it to the village collective to decide on the 
issue of membership. 
260. While the study cannot provide any causal observation between the connection variable and the 
outcome, it reveals that courts in China do find the various connection variables relevant in adjudicating MOW 
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“possessing a share certificate,” the presence of all other connections tends to 
help MOW’s cases.261 
Sixth, the data in Table 4 shows that 77.63% of the monetary claims had 
a recovery rate of 100%. This is a very high recovery rate by any standard, 
which shows that courts favor MOW litigants.262 
Seventh, the data shows the plaintiffs without legal representation had a 
higher success rate than plaintiffs with representation. 263 This outcome is 
possibly the result of the court favoring the weakest of the weak (the 
unrepresented “have-nots” being even weaker than the represented “have- 
nots”).264 If this is true, and using the same logic, it reinforces the view that the 
courts favored the weaker party (MOW) in these cases. 
Finally, when deciding who bears the burden of proof in relation to 
MOW’s primary source of income, Table 18b shows that the court imposed the 
burden on the defendant 56.08% of the time and on the plaintiff only 43.92% 
of the time. This is interesting as the plaintiff is the one who is trying to show 
connection with her natal village. It shows the court’s favor towards the 
plaintiff, even in the allocation of evidential responsibility. 
 
C. WHY DID THE COURTS FAVOR THE “HAVE-NOTS”? 
 
1. Courts Generally Sympathized with the MOW and Believed They 
Were Being Treated Unfairly in the Compensation Allocation 
Process 
MOW litigants in China find themselves in a precarious position. On the 
one hand, because MOW are “married-out,” their natal villages excluded them 
in all rural land compensation distributions.265 On the other hand, MOW are 
not guaranteed land ownership in their husbands’ villages due to policy 
reasons.266 In fact, most of the time, due to the “no change for thirty years” 
 
cases. As noted earlier, the law is silent on what criteria qualify an individual for village collective 
membership. The court, if it follows the principle of “village autonomy”, should either completely defer to the 
village collective or confirm the collective’s decision, no matter what that decision is. 
261. See supra Table 10. 
262. But in certain regions, courts tend to find a midway solution by “discounting” the compensation that 
the plaintiff would get, even if the plaintiff successfully established her case. Interview with Anonymous 
Female Judge in Shaanxi Province, supra note 156. 
263. See supra Table 11a. The three-way cross-tab analysis that shows a similar trend. 
264. See supra Table 11a. One possible explanation for unrepresented MOW’s higher success rate is that 
the court sympathizes with them and adopts a more relaxed approach (both procedurally and in deciding the 
substantive case) as compared to MOW who are represented. 
265. Historically, only men get to inherit property. Women play a subservient role to their husband within 
the family. Many of the cultural biases against women have continued in modern-day rural China. 
266. Judd, supra note 14, at 690; Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Rangita de Silva de Alwis, The Recently 
Revised Marriage Law of China: The Promise and the Reality, 13 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 251, 267 (2004) 
(“[W]omen must rely more heavily on adjustment in landholdings to obtain land. With growing official 
discouragement and legal limitation of readjustments, women increasingly have difficulty obtaining land in 
their husbands’ villages or retaining land in their parents’ villages.”). 
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land policy in China, the MOW receive no land interests in their husbands’ 
villages. 267 The discrimination against MOW within Chinese rural 
communities has been institutionalized. 268 It is observed that courts generally 
sympathized with MOW litigants and believed they were treated unfairly in the 
compensation allocation process. One informant confirms that most courts 
recognize the difficult situation MOW litigants are in and believe they have 
been unfairly treated by their natal village collectives.269 In those courts’ view, 
such unfair treatment is a violation of gender equality laws.270 Perhaps the 
courts understand that, if they were to treat MOW lawsuits as “arms-length” 
lawsuits, MOW litigants will very likely fail, an outcome that they find unjust 
and an infringement of the principle of gender equality.271 
2. Courts Sided with the “Have-Nots” to Establish Their Own 
Legitimacy 
The Chinese courts fit well into Haynie’s theoretical framework under 
which courts in developing countries deliberately favor the “have-nots” to 
establish their own legitimacy, which in turn secures stability and 
development. 272 Courts in China are institutionally weak, especially when 
compared to their counterparts in developed countries. They inherit a tainted 
public image from the previous period in which courts operated very much like 
mediation centers, rather than arbiters of justice.273 Courts need to be strategic 
to improve their position among “superior authorities.”274 By establishing a 
reputation for defending the weak, the judiciary is able to wield  informal 
power within the Chinese political structure, which in turn elevates the status 
of judges. 275 These concerns may have motivated courts to adopt a 
 
 
267. Judd, supra note 14. The “no change for 30 years” policy does not in itself discriminate against 
MOW. Under this policy, MOW may keep the land that they owns in their natal village. The discrimination 
comes from MOW being denied compensation by the village collective following rural land expropriation. 
268. Bo, supra note 100 (explaining that Chinese culture regarding land use is one reason women’s rights 
are diminished in rural societies). 
269. Interview with Anonymous Female Judge in Shaanxi Province, supra note 156. 
270. Id. 
271. Id. 
272. See Haynie, Resource Inequalities and Litigation Outcomes, supra note 9, at 753. 
273. CHAN, supra note 156. See generally Peter C.H. Chan, An Uphill Battle: How China’s Obsession 
with Social Stability is Blocking Judicial Reform, 100 JUDICATURE 14 (2016) (offering a critical appraisal of 
China’s contemporary judicial reform); Peter C.H. Chan, Civil Mediation in Imperial, Republican and 
Modern-Day China: Historical and Cultural Norms under the Traditional Chinese Legal Order, 85 TVR [LEG. 
HIST. REV.] 577 (2017) (documenting a historical account of China’s mediation system); Peter C.H. Chan, 
Opciones de Mediación para Resolver Disputas Comerciales en China [Mediation Options for Resolving 
Commercial Disputes in China], 41 REV. CHILEAN DER. 153 (2014) (giving an overview of China’s 
contemporary commercial mediation system); Peter C.H. Chan, The Enigma of Civil Justice in Imperial 
China: A Legal Historical Enquiry, 19 MAASTRICH. J. EUR. & COMP. L. 317 (2012) (exploring a legal 
historical overview of China’s civil justice system). 
274. He, supra note 23, at 329. 
275. Recent judicial reform clearly aimed to enhance the image of Chinese courts as a way to “regain the 
public’s trust and confidence in the system.” See CHAN, supra note 156, at 241. Previously, the Chinese court 
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redistributive approach when adjudicating MOW disputes.276 MOW litigation 
has become less sensitive than before. 277 One informant said the village 
collective is unlikely to “stir things up” if the court ruled in favor of MOW.278 
By leveling the playing field for the “have-nots” (MOW), the Chinese courts 
can establish their public image as vanguards of gender equality, but bear 
minimal political risk.279 Since DADs are required to be uploaded online by the 
SPC, courts understand the negative public relations implications if their 
decisions are found to be inconsistent or biased in favor of the privileged.280 
Since DADs are made public, ruling in favor of the weak promotes the courts’ 
public image like no other campaign could. 
 
D. LAWYER CAPABILITY 
The role of lawyers in shaping litigation outcomes has been widely 
discussed.281 From the data, the impact of legal representation on the plaintiff’s 
(MOW) success is mainly negative with two exceptional situations. The 
bivariate analysis in Table 11a shows plaintiffs without legal representation 
had a higher success rate. With the exception of two situations, shown in Table 
12e & Table 12g, the three-way cross-tabs analysis presents a similar trend 
identified in the bivariate analysis in Table 11a (for example, the plaintiff 
without legal representation had a higher rate of success). This is an atypical 
situation since under the party capability theory, lawyers should play a positive 
role in shaping the outcome.282 For example, a study found that experienced 
 
 
was criticized for its over-reliance on judicial mediation and abdication from the role of the rule-enforcer. See 
Carl F. Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935, 939 (2011). 
276. The main objective of China’s most recent judicial reform is to establish a system where “the people 
feel that justice is done in every single court case.” CHAN, supra note 157; see also Guanyu Quanmian 
Shenhua Renmin Fayuan Gaige De Yijian, Renmin Fayuan Disi Ge Wunian Guihua Gangyao (关于全面深化
人民法院改革的意见—人民法院第四个五年改革纲要 (2014–2018)) [Opinions of the Supreme People’s 
Court on Comprehensive Deepening of Reform of People’s Courts—The 4th Five-Year Outline of the 
Program for Reform of People’s Courts (2014–2018)] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Feb. 4, 2015, 
effective Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.chinacourt.org/law/detail/2015/02/id/148096.shtml (China). 
277. But see Randall Peerenboom, Economic and Social Rights: The Role of Courts in China, 12 SAN 
DIEGO INT’L LAW J. 303 (2011). 
278. Interview with Anonymous Female Judge in Shaanxi Province, supra note 156 (explaining that 
unsuccessful village collectives seldom appeal and almost never petition against the court decision) (xinfang) 
see also Interview with Anonymous Male Judge in Jiangxi Province, supra note 250 (noting that enforcement 
of MOW-favoring judgments, which used to be difficult in the past due to resistance from some villages, is no 
longer a problem today). 
279. Interview with Anonymous Female Judge in Shaanxi Province, supra note 156. The informant is of 
the view that the MOW litigant can place more political pressure on the courts (through xinfang), than village 
collectives. Id. 
280. Interview with Anonymous Male Judge in Jiangxi Province, supra note 250. 
281. See, e.g., John Szmer et al., supra note 130130, at 298 (“Litigation team experience and size affect 
the Court’s decisionmaking, even after controlling for several factors, including ideology and party 
capability.”). 
282. See Interview with Anonymous Male Judge in Jiangxi Province, supra note 250. An informant holds 
the contrary view that lawyers help the MOW’s case by offering useful strategies, such as inquiring about the 
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lawyers are like RPs who can reverse the disadvantageous position of OS- 
litigants.283 Another study found that represented “have-nots” came out ahead 
in the Israeli High Courts of Justice, the same court in which the unrepresented 
“have-nots” were losing. 284 One possible explanation for unrepresented 
plaintiff’s (MOW) higher success is that the Chinese court sympathizes with 
them and adopts a more relaxed approach, both procedurally and in deciding 
the substantive case, as compared to plaintiffs who had representation.285 
The data in Table 11b shows that whenever the defendant had legal 
representation, MOW litigants lost more often, independent of whether or not 
the plaintiff had legal representation. 286 This is consistent with the party 
capability theory of lawyers. 
The data in Table 11a shows that most plaintiffs had legal representation 
(77.69%). The proportion of plaintiffs having legal representation is higher 
than that of defendants. The plaintiffs’ legal representatives are attorneys from 
professional law firms, not “street lawyers” or paralegals (Table 11c). This 
contradicts the view that “have-nots” are less likely to be able to find quality 
representation.287 
 
E. OTHER OBSERVATIONS 
It appears the court takes procedural irregularity of the allocation process 
seriously. As shown in Table 16b, MOW is 100% successful when the court 
finds procedural defect in the allocation agreement.288 
Some studies have suggested that petitions by MOW (xinfang) have 
exerted pressure on local courts. 289 The data does not offer a conclusive 
answer. As shown in Table 17, while MOW did not lose a single case when the 
petition result was provided in the DAD,290 in cases where no outcome of the 
petition was provided, the losing rate of MOW is higher than that when no 
Previous Citizens’ Petition was lodged.291 
It is still true that in certain regions—such as various regions in 
Guangdong Province—courts would only accept MOW cases when an 
 
 
attitudes of the courts before commencing litigation or bringing a “test case” to test the waters before other 
MOW commence proceedings. Id. Galanter, supra note 1, at 114–19. 
283. Kevin T. McGuire, Repeat Players in the Supreme Court: The Role of Experienced Lawyers in 
Litigation Success, 57 J. POLITICS 187, 190–91 (1995). 
284. Dotan, supra note 7, at 1077. 
285. CHAN, supra note 156. 
286. The above three-way cross-tabs analysis in Table 14a, Table 14b and Table 14j confirms the trend 
identified in the bivariate analysis in Table 11a. For example, the defendant with legal representation had a 
higher rate of success. 
287. Galanter, supra note 1, at 114–119. 
288. 80% complete win, 20% partial win. But the rate of frequency of allocation agreements having 
procedural defects is rather low (2.02%) (n=496). See Table 16b. 
289. Chen & Gao, supra note 99; see also Gui, supra note 96, at 168. 
290. This covers whether or not the Previous Citizens’ Petition was favorable to the MOW. 
291. In cases where no outcome of the petition was provided, the MOW’s losing rate was 11.11%. In 
cases where no Previous Citizens’ Petition was lodged, the MOW’s losing rate was 6.12%. 
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administrative ruling on the village collective membership issue had been 
issued.292 From the data in Table 17, it appears that the MOW never  lost a 
court case with a favorable prior administrative ruling and never won a court 
case with an unfavorable prior administrative ruling. Thus, courts place a high 
premium on prior administrative decisions regarding MOW disputes. 
Another observation from Table 17 is that, when MOW have litigated the 
issue before,293 and subsequently won,294 their success rate in the subsequent 
court proceedings is 100%.295 This confirms the view that an OS-litigant, with 
some prior and relevant litigation experience, can emerge as a party with 
certain RP attributes because of the previous experience and enjoy advantages 
of the RP in the subsequent lawsuit.296 
It appears the reverse logic is true about “have-nots” winning due to the 
court favoring the MOW. When the court is determined to uphold “village 
autonomy,” the MOW litigant has a much greater chance of losing the case. 
From the data (Tables 16a and 16b), MOW have not won a single case when 
the court has approved the decision of the village collective on the MOW’s 
membership status, whether on the basis of the villagers’ charter or allocation 
agreement. 
Studies have shown that provincial legislation that protects individual 
rights is very important in the judicial enforcement of such rights.297 This is 
borne out in the data in Table 14c, where whenever any provincial statute that 
protect women’s rights was applied in the case, MOW prevailed 100% of the 
time. The same is true when the court applied pro-MOW provincial judicial 
rules. 
The data shows that most MOW have either moved to their husbands’ 
villages or stayed in the natal villages after marriage (with a frequency rate of 
90.67%). As seen in Table 8c, only a small fraction have moved to the cities 
(with a frequency rate of 9.33%). This reinforces the view that the MOW issue 




292. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Female, Judge, Guangdong Province Basic-Level Court (Apr. 
13, 2018) [hereinafter Interview with Anonymous Female Judge in Guangdong Province]. 
293. These previous lawsuits mostly concern the same MOW litigant suing the same village collective for 
government compensation in prior land expropriations. 
294. There are quite a number of these cases: the rate of frequency is 13.47% (n=802). See supra Table 17. 
295. Complete win being 79.63% and partial win being 20.37%. See supra Table 17. An alternative 
explanation for the MOW litigant’s greater success is that she had already received judicial confirmation of her 
membership in the previous lawsuit. 
296. In fact, more MOW litigants are now organizing themselves in groups to campaign for their cause 
and exert pressure on the government. See, e.g., Bo, supra note 100, at 117 (the “one person one letter to the 
People’s Congress” (一人一信到人大) campaign in Guangdong Province); see also XUANCHENG FUNV WANG 
[WOMEN’S NETWORK OF XUANCHENG CITY], http://www.ahxcwomen.gov.cn/plus/view.php?aid=225 
(last updated Apr. 26, 2018) (listing updates on collective actions of MOW); Susan D. Franck & Linsey E. 
Wylie, Predicting Outcomes in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 65 DUKE L.J. 459, 501 (2015). 
297. See, e.g., Cheng and Ke, supra note 80 (explaining the impact of provincial and local labor rules on 
labor dispute adjudication). 
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F. LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY 
Despite its novel discoveries, this study has a number of limitations. First, 
the number of “losing” cases for the MOW is relatively small. As such, the 
significance of some variables in the variation of the outcome is unknown, as 
chi-square tests cannot be performed when the samples are too small. If the 
overall sample is increased to more than 858 sampled DADs, it is believed that 
chi-square tests can be performed on all variables. Second, the study does not 
shed light on the causal relations between the variables and the outcome of the 
case, which requires more delicate statistical modeling. Third, the study does 
not provide an exposition on the situation on a national level of married-out 
women being denied access to court, a problem that has persisted for many 
years. 298 An informant confirms, 299 however, that few courts today would 
reject cases filed by MOW in one particular province,300 and another informant 
noted that the problem has significantly improved in another province,301 but 
only after the implementation of the SPC Case-Filing Registration Rules.302 
The data shows that there is an explosion in the number of MOW lawsuits 
since 2014, which seems to suggest that access to court has improved. 303 
Nevertheless, these are piecemeal evidence only, and a more thorough 
empirical study is necessary to gauge the actual reality of the problem. Overall, 
this study focuses on the litigation aspect of the MOW issue and not on the out-
of-court dispute resolution process. Fourth, this study does not touch upon 
cases withdrawn by the plaintiffs or settled by the parties, information that may 
shed light on the RP’s long-term litigation strategies.304 But these types of 
cases are publicly unavailable and would require extensive field investigation 
to collect. Finally, the study sampled DADs that are available online. It is 
expected that courts will not disclose all DADs, as some of them may be 
politically sensitive. The sample, therefore, cannot be completely 
representative using publicly available sources.305 However, given that MOW 
lawsuits have become a type of run-of-the-mill case,306 it is expected that the 








298. He, supra note 23, at 204. 
299. Interview with Anonymous Male Judge in Jiangxi Province, supra note 250. 
300. Jiangxi Province. 
301. Hubei Province. 
302. Interview with Anonymous Male Attorney, supra note 250. 
303. See supra Table 1. 
304. Galanter, supra note 1, at 125 fig.3. 
305. He and Su, supra note 2, at 128. 
306. Interview with Anonymous Male Judge in Jiangxi Province, supra note 250. 
307. See supra Table 4. 
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CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The main contribution of this Article is the empirical discovery that the 
“have-nots” (the MOW litigants) came out ahead in China’s courts by a 
substantial margin. This finding contradicts Galanter’s party capability theory 
(under which the “haves” should prevail) and the established view that the 
“haves” should come out ahead in China (a leading study on Shanghai courts 
found the “haves” prevailing by large margins). This Article shows that 
Galanter’s party capability theory is inapplicable when the courts favor the 
weaker party and are determined to level the playing field between the “haves” 
and the “have-nots.” The data shows that the Chinese courts in MOW lawsuits 
favored the MOW litigant. The courts sided with MOW litigants out of 
sympathy for MOW, whom, in the courts’ view, were being unfairly treated by 
the village collectives. The courts may have also sided with the MOW litigants 
as a strategic consideration to establish the courts’ own legitimacy through 
protecting the weak. It is believed that the courts’ favor for the “have-nots” 
(MOW) neutralized the party-capability advantages enjoyed by the “haves” 
(village collectives) and ultimately propelled the “have-nots” to victory. 
This Article also shows that the lack of judicial independence in China, 
which enhances the likelihood of courts being swayed by powerful external 
influence in favor of the stronger party, does not necessarily guarantee victory 
for the “haves.”308 The Chinese judiciary, like any judicial institution in the 
developing world where the legitimacy of the court is not a pre-existing feature 
of the political system, would strive to establish a public image of the rights- 
protector and resource redistributor, at least in “some components of their 
docket.”309 MOW lawsuits happen to fall within this category of cases. Chinese 
courts, after evaluating the political risks involved, sided with the “have-nots” 
(MOW) as part of an exercise to build up the courts’ legitimacy. 
Aside from its theoretical contribution to the party capability theory, this 
study offers insight into the role of the judiciary in Chinese society, the 
protection of rural women’s land rights in China, and other issues with 
potential policy implications. First, the study contributes to the debate on 
whether China has judicial independence. Previously, China’s grassroots  
courts were seen as partial and relatively weak, and even corrupt institutions 
that were susceptible to external interference, such as the local government and 
rural organizations. It follows that the privileged and the powerful are likely to 
have an advantage in litigation, given their connections and superior resources. 
This study shows that the Chinese grassroots court, to a certain degree and in 




308. Interview with Anonymous Male Judge in Jiangxi Province, supra note 250. 
309. Haynie, Resource Inequalities and Litigation Outcomes, supra note 9, at 753. 
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Second, the study shows that grassroots courts can be effective rights- 
enforcers—in this case, by tackling gender inequality—when the opportunity 
presents itself and when the political risks of enforcing such rights are 
manageable. 
Third, the study shows that China is moving in the right direction (in line 
with international norms) by protecting rural women’s land rights in civil 
cases. The findings will help the CEDAW Committee and China understand 
the MOW issue in more concrete terms and better focus their dialogue going 
forward. 
Fourth, this research shows that, even in an authoritarian state, 
government-connected institutions—the village collective—do not always win 
in lawsuits brought by the individual “commoner.” The outcome of the case 
does not depend entirely upon the litigant’s political connections and 
institutional strength. Finally, despite the central government’s policy of 
respecting rural self-governance, this study suggests that grassroots courts are 
capable, given the right circumstances, of penetrating local customs and 
practices, as well as providing direct remedies to rights-seeking claimants. 
Hopefully, future research can build on this study and add to the debate 
on Galanter’s theory, rural women’s rights protection in China, and the role of 
the judiciary in the Chinese society. 
